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Many learned reports have been issued over the years about the operations of the Philadelphia Gas Works, 
but we would venture to say that this is the first such report prompted in no small part by good news 
regarding PGW. Under the leadership of CEO Tom Knudsen and Finance chief Joe Bogdonavage, PGW has 
stopped hemorrhaging cash. Collections are up, an emergency City loan has been repaid and the City-owned 
utility’s credit outlook has improved. Moreover, Mayor Nutter has appointed a new oversight board, chaired 
by David Seltzer, that seems determined to look at PGW with a fresh eye. The purpose of this report 
therefore is not to sound an alarm about an imminent crisis, but to provide a clear-headed look at PGW’s 
operational handicaps and burdensome rate structure—and to point the way toward still-needed reforms. 
The report’s main message is that unless major changes are pursued, recent improvements will prove 
transitory. The underlying structural problems are simply too great. Here are some of the findings that leap 
out: 
 PGW’s overlapping governance structure is inefficient, expensive and, perhaps most important, 
creates a situation where, in the words of the report, “no one oversight group is held responsible or 
accountable for PGW’s performance.” 
 For a variety of reasons, labor costs are higher than at comparable utilities. The number of 
employees per customer is double the national average. 
 PGW is so starved of capital that it often borrows money to fund ongoing operations, which the 
report likens to using a credit card to pay monthly bills. Its long-term debt as a percentage of total 
assets is triple the national average for gas-only utilities. Though its credit outlook has gone from 
“negative” to “stable”, its bond rating is still dismally low. 
 PGW caps the utility bills of low-income customers, requiring full-paying customers to make up the 
difference. With gas prices rising this subsidy program has grown five-fold since 2002, a hidden cost 
that amounts to nearly a fifth of a full-paying customer’s bill. Because their bills are based upon 
household income and not actual gas consumption, low income customers have no incentive to 
conserve and indeed use nearly 50 percent more gas on average than full-paying customers.   
 PGW’s rates are the highest in Pennsylvania and the highest among 20 Snowbelt cities—an issue 
that affects not only customers’ pocketbooks but the City’s economic competitiveness. 
Most other cities, as the report notes, manage to meet their citizens’ needs for natural gas without actually 
owning a gas company. So it’s logical to ask whether, with all its other challenges, Philadelphia should be in 
this business. The report examines the pros and cons of different ownership models, including an outright 
sale. Those hoping for a windfall will be disappointed, however. While many variables play into the valuation 
of a concern like PGW, the report concludes that, if the City decided to divest itself of PGW in the near 
future, it might well have to pay private owners to take it off its hands. 
Indeed, no clear path emerges from the report’s analysis of the pros and cons of different ownership 
models. A fair reading might lead to the conclusion that the legal, financial and political hurdles to selling 
PGW—or turning it over to an independent authority—currently outweigh the potential benefits.  But that 
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conclusion in no way justifies maintaining the status quo. “Truly transformational change is needed to 
reverse a never-ending cycle of increasing costs,” the report’s authors conclude. “Without it, PGW’s debt 
burden will continue to grow, customer bills will continue to rise and finances will drift perpetually 
downward … Business-as-usual is simply not an option.” 
We want to thank Steve Wray and Erik Johanson of the Economy League of Greater Philadelphia and Rick 
Stys and Derek Hansel of Fairmount Capital Advisors for their hard work on this cogent report. We hope it 
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About the Project Partners 
The Pew Charitable Trusts 
The Pew Charitable Trusts is driven by the power of knowledge to solve today’s most challenging problems. 
Pew applies a rigorous, analytical approach to improve public policy, inform the public and stimulate civic 
life. In the Philadelphia region, Pew partners with many local institutions to encourage a thriving arts and 
cultural community; support the health and welfare of the region’s neediest residents; inform discussion on 
important issues facing the City; and, more broadly, strengthen Philadelphia’s appeal to visitors and 
residents alike. 
The William Penn Foundation 
The William Penn Foundation, founded in 1945 by Otto and Phoebe Haas, is dedicated to improving the 
quality of life in the Greater Philadelphia region through efforts that foster rich cultural expression, 
strengthen children’s futures, and deepen connections to nature and community. In partnership with 
others, the Foundation works to advance a vital, just, and caring community. 
The Economy League of Greater Philadelphia 
The Economy League of Greater Philadelphia is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization 
dedicated to research and analysis of the region's resources and challenges with the goal of promoting 
sound public policy and increasing the region's prosperity. 
Fairmount Capital Advisors 
Fairmount Capital Advisors is a financial advisory firm established in 1987 to serve governmental and not-
for-profit clients.  Fairmount has advised its clients on capital market transactions for virtually every type of 
credit, including derivative product services.  The firm also provides clients with a variety of consulting 
services including valuation, strategic financial planning and economic impact analysis. 
CBIZ Valuation 
CBIZ Valuation Group is solely dedicated to the “art and science” of valuation, financial advisory and 
litigation support services. CBIZ provides valuation, financial advisory and litigation support services for: 
businesses partnerships, and joint ventures; capital cost segregation; closely-held equity, debt, derivative 
securities, economic loss or damages, fixed asset records, intellectual property, insurance appraisals, 
machinery and equipment, and real estate.




In the 13 years since the Economy League’s last study of the Philadelphia Gas Works found it had become a 
risk to the City and its customers, the City-owned utility has taken strides in the right direction. Better billing 
practices and enforcement tools have repaired PGW’s once-chronically deficient collection rates. PGW has 
repaid an eight-year-old loan from the City, and the utility’s improved credit outlook could lower future 
capital costs. With a management plan to build on this momentum, a new administration in City Hall, and 
new mayoral appointees on PGW’s executive board, it is time to ask whether a lasting remedy is finally 
within reach. 
 
Impediments and Remedies 
Although PGW is no longer in crisis, its ailments have merely shifted from acute to chronic. Despite 
improvements, its rates still outpace the cost of gas service in Philadelphia’s peer cities. PGW remains too 
troubled for the City to profitably sell, yet keeping it will require difficult decisions about reducing subsidies 
to low-income customers, seeking even higher rates, allowing its workforce to shrink, and spending tens of 
millions to improve its efficiency. If the City declines to make fundamental changes, it will continue to forgo 
any return on PGW’s considerable assets, PGW’s debt will keep mounting, and residents will be saddled 
with ever-higher gas bills. 
Five fundamental impediments require reform: 
A Labyrinthine Governance Structure 
PGW’s capacity for reform will hinge on management’s flexibility and responsiveness. Yet, more than 30 
elected and appointed officials have their hands on the PGW steering wheel. The resulting governance 
gridlock convolutes even mundane operational processes, thwarts coherent policy, and increases already-
high operating costs.  
Remedy: Governance reform. A streamlined governance structure is essential to improve 
management’s flexibility and responsiveness and should be considered a prerequisite to continued City 
ownership. 
A Low-Income Customer Base 
PGW’s strictly urban service area leaves it particularly vulnerable to Philadelphia’s shrinking population and 
high concentration of poverty. One in four PGW customers receives heavily subsidized service, which drives 
up costs to the extent that full rate-paying customers are forced to pay the highest natural gas rates in 
Pennsylvania. 
To aid PGW’s many low-income customers, its largest social program is based on income rather than usage 
and therefore gives participants no incentive to conserve gas. As a result, these customers use 47 percent 
more gas than customers paying the full rate. Rising commodity prices will increase the cost of this overuse, 
ensuring that the rates paid by full-freight customers have nowhere to go but up. 
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Remedy: Reform Social Programs. Low-income residents will always require some degree of aid, 
whether provided directly by PGW or through some other government program. Still, the City must rein 
in the skyrocketing cost of its social programs, which will require an appropriate balance between 
PGW’s dual roles as a gas works and social welfare agency. Potential strategies: 
 Create incentives for conservation by discounting bills rather than basing them on income. 
 Make this “hidden tax” on full-fare customers more transparent and equitable by paying social 
program costs out of the City’s general fund. 
 Cap the program’s costs. 
Onerous Capital Obligations 
Limited cash flow over the past 12 fiscal years has forced PGW to continually use short-term loans to fund 
certain operations—akin to using a credit card to pay monthly bills. PGW also continually borrows money to 
finance the bulk of repairs and replacement of its infrastructure—like paying down a mortgage and then 
taking out a home equity loan for the same amount. As a result, PGW incrementally adds to its long-term 
debt burden each year.  
To keep its debt from rising faster, PGW has kept its capital spending reined in. This has helped control debt 
service obligations and improve PGW’s credit outlook, but it has caused some to question the prudence of 
postponing replacement of the utility’s aging, City-owned physical assets. 
Remedy: Enhance Cash Flow. Management’s Business Transformation initiative could produce 
sustainable, long-term cost savings. However, the City has funded only a scaled-back portion of the 
initiative that is unlikely to change PGW’s fundamentally flawed cost structure. Longer-term initiatives 
would require a much larger upfront investment but offer a more substantial payoff. 
Rising Energy Prices 
Although bill collections have improved even amid escalating costs and the highest rates in Pennsylvania, 
the recent rise in energy prices poses a threat. Increased commodity costs will mean even higher bills for 
PGW’s unsubsidized customers. Any resulting increase in delinquent payments would limit PGW’s ability to 
meet revenue expectations and control bad debt expenses. PGW can do little to mitigate the impact of this 
trend: Commodity costs are directly passed through to PGW customers and represent an increasingly large 
portion of customer bills. 
Remedy: Strategic Energy Initiatives. Strategically leveraging the City’s other utility operations could 
mitigate PGW’s lack of business diversification and create a more cost-effective, sustainable and 
profitable enterprise for the whole City. Potential strategies: 
 Search for potential synergies with the operations of the Philadelphia Water Department. 
 Acquire the assets of competitor energy commodities to tap commercial and industrial markets. 
 Promote natural gas as a clean energy source, burnishing PGW as an environmentally friendly 
alternative. 
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High Labor Costs 
PGW’s staffing ratios are far out of line with industry standards partly because of the unique demands of 
distributing natural gas in a wholly urban environment. PGW also requires a labor force with the 
institutional knowledge to handle its unique operating environment. Looming retirements put that 
institutional knowledge at risk—by 2011, more than 600 of PGW’s 1,700 employees will become eligible to 
retire, which would leave behind a younger, less experienced staff. 
Remedy: Succession Planning and Planned Attrition. Retirements present an opportunity to better 
align staffing ratios with industry standards. Succession planning would mitigate the deleterious 
consequences of losing institutional knowledge and leverage labor attrition as a way to reduce 
operating costs. 
 
Potential Strategic Alternatives 
The City would lose money by selling PGW in its present state. An updated valuation as part of this report 
found that the City would likely have to pay another entity to take PGW off its hands. 
This reality does not necessarily rule out a sale. The City’s decision should be driven by its objectives. If the 
City’s priority is eliminating PGW as an ongoing financial liability, it could sell PGW at a loss. If the City 
considers PGW a strategic asset, it could adopt policies to encourage civic objectives such as economic 
development and sustainability. To sift through these options, policymakers must first establish clear goals. 
The City has three ownership options: 
Sell Assets to a Private Firm 
Selling PGW would remove its liabilities from the City’s balance sheet. Although a new operating structure 
ultimately could lower the cost to customers, selling PGW would take months and cost the City millions.  
The price would hinge in part on the type of transaction. Options include: 
 An immediate sale by standard auction.  
 A deferred sale via an operating and maintenance contract. 
 A two-step sale of PGW’s liquefied natural gas and distribution assets. 
Retain City Ownership 
Retaining PGW would allow the City to act to protect the public interest. Yet, many would argue that the 
City’s actions regarding PGW to date have not been in the public interest and that City control has been 
anything but a safeguard. Without strategic action, the public interest will continue to be at risk. 
Continued City ownership would also allow any savings realized from improvements to accrue to the City 
and its customers. However, the City is constrained in its ability to improve PGW’s existing position. Because 
the City has limited resources to fund such reform, continued ownership represents a financial risk. As long 
as the City owns PGW, it will remain exposed to the consequences of inaction.  
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The City can take several steps to shield itself from this escalating financial risk: 
 Support internal managerial reform: Invest in policies and programs to make PGW operate more 
efficiently and effectively. 
 Enter into an operating and maintenance contract: A private operator would take on PGW’s 
operating responsibilities, while the City would retain ownership of physical assets and liabilities. 
 Give PGW employees an ownership stake in the utility: Lease PGW to a private equity firm, giving 
PGW employees equity shares in the company and a natural incentive to boost efficiency. 
Create a New Authority 
Transferring PGW’s assets and liabilities to a new, independent authority would allow the City to eliminate 
the financial risk of PGW from its balance sheets while retaining a degree of representation in the 
authority’s governance, a voice in setting rates, and greater flexibility to explore other potential strategic 
initiatives, such as expanding its role into alternative energy markets or energy conservation. Continued 
public employment would limit any labor backlash, and tax-exempt status would minimize the new entity’s 
capital—and therefore customer—costs. 
The process of conveyance would be costly and time-consuming to the City and would require sustained 
political and legal cooperation among all stakeholders, while not necessarily correcting PGW’s underlying 
structural impediments.  
Such an authority could assume control of: 
 PGW assets and liabilities only. 
 Metropolitan gas assets and liabilities by joining PGW with PECO Gas. 
 
A Need for Action 
Business as usual is not a viable alternative; the City must act while it still can. If nothing is done to remedy 
PGW’s fundamental flaws, it will continue to deteriorate, and it will do so at an increasing cost to the City 
and its rate-paying customers. Eventually, PGW will be on life support, and decision-makers will be left with 
an impossible choice between throwing more money into an enterprise with no hope of survival and simply 
pulling the plug. 
 
9 | P a g e  
 
Glossary 
Drawn from: American Gas Association, “2004-2006 Performance Benchmarks for Natural Gas Utilities” 
 
Assets: The total accounting value of a company's productive resources at a point in time (as on a balance 
sheet). 
Capitalization: The structure of a firm's long-term financing. "Capitalization" refers to the combination of 
debt and equity, which (in addition to retained earnings) is the monetary equivalent of the firm's assets. 
Customer: An entity which enters into an account with a utility in order to receive natural gas for heating, 
power, feedstock, and other uses. For current purposes, an individual gas meter functionally represents 
each customer account. As such the terms "customer," "meter," and "account" are used interchangeably. 
Customers per employee: Total customers (including both sales and transportation) divided by total 
employees. 
Debt: The summed monetary value of a company's short- and long-term obligations to repay money that it 
has borrowed from lenders. 
Depreciation: The operating expense that, as an accounting mechanism, represents the predetermined 
annual write-down of a durable capital asset. Depreciation, as an accounting item, impacts net income and 
taxes. It is not a cash expenditure, but is an annual recognition of long-lived asset costs which are spread 
over the years that these assets are expected to be in operation. 
EBITDA: A measure which describes, for an accounting period, the total company income net of operations 
expense, but not yet net of interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization expenses. This measure facilitates 
comparisons of companies' economic output from operations. 
Long-term debt: Financial instruments that become due on a date at least one year beyond the current 
accounting period. These include the mortgages and bonds, which represents a company's capital 
borrowings. By issuing debt, the company has an obligation to repay its lenders the amount borrowed plus 
regular increments of interest. 
Mcf: 1000 cubic feet, a standard unit measurement in the oil and gas industry for natural gas. 
Net value: The residual value of a company's assets after deducting liabilities. 
Operations and maintenance (O&M): These are accounting summaries of expenditures attributable to 
company operations. Most importantly, these are expenses over which management has direction. These 
are distinct from (i.e., do not include) expenses imposed from outside of operations such as interest 
payments and amortization. 
Operating revenue: The receipts from utility operations and sales of gas, excluding non-utility and other 
income, before expenses are considered. 
Therm: A unit of measurement for energy, equivalent to 100,000 British thermal units. 
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Section I.  Why Yet Another Report on PGW? 
 
Philadelphia is an aging, post-industrial city that has taken heartening strides in recent years. Yet, familiar 
challenges—violent crime, low educational attainment, the rising cost of municipal employee benefits—still 
eat away at budgetary resources and compromise Philadelphia’s ability to continue this progress.  
Although many cities face similar concerns, Philadelphia has a policy concern that is uniquely its own:  The 
Philadelphia Gas Works, the 170-year-old natural gas distribution system owned by the City, is an anomaly 
among America’s utilities. Nowhere else in the country is there a municipally owned utility that deals 
exclusively in natural gas and operates in an entirely urban environment. No other city owns a utility whose 
customer base is as large or includes such a high proportion of low-income households or whose 
governance structure is as byzantine as PGW’s. As a result, no model solutions exist for PGW to emulate. 
These constraints—along with an aging infrastructure—have left PGW in a generally uncompetitive and 
financially precarious position. The upshot: Philadelphia residents are charged much higher than average 
rates to heat their homes. Meanwhile, the City government’s balance sheet carries PGW’s growing capital 
debt while gaining no revenue from this considerable investment. 
However, like the City itself, PGW stands at a crossroads. Recent operational efficiencies have created an 
environment in which deeper structural solutions might now be possible. It might now be feasible to 
fundamentally reconfigure energy distribution in Philadelphia to give residents better service at more 
competitive rates and end the financial risk to taxpayers. With a new administration in City Hall and with 
new mayoral appointees on the Philadelphia Facilities Management Corp., PGW’s Board of Directors, 
interest is high in taking a fresh look at the roots of this long-standing problem and in determining whether 
a lasting remedy is finally within reach. 
 
A.  The Roots of the Problem 
Most other large U.S. cities satisfactorily meet their energy needs through either private energy companies 
that typically cover neighboring jurisdictions and provide additional service such as electricity, or through 
diversified public utilities that also serve suburban customers. Why does Philadelphia not follow this norm?  
Formed in 1835 by City ordinance, Philadelphia’s gas utility originally operated under private management, 
but soon was absorbed by the City under a board of trustees and subsequently placed under the 
Department of Public Works. In 1897, the City contracted with the United Gas Improvement Co. to operate 
PGW. This arrangement retained City ownership and lasted until 1972, when the City transferred that 
responsibility to the Philadelphia Facilities Management Corp. a not-for-profit entity that is now one of 
several overseeing PGW. 
Today, the utility remains a component of City government, responsible for acquiring, storing and 
distributing natural gas within city limits—an area of 129 square miles and about 1.45 million residents. 
About 95 percent of PGW’s customers are households; 5 percent are commercial or industrial customers. 
Despite being owned by the City, PGW is operated as a regulated near-monopoly, separate from the City’s 
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general fund. It is required to pay an $18 million annual dividend to the City, but this dividend has not been 
increased since 1980, and City Council has granted it back to PGW each year since 2004. 
The City considered selling PGW on several occasions throughout its history. In each instance, City leaders 
were either unwilling or unable to part with the assets and instead settled for restructuring management as 
a temporary solution. By 1995, PGW had fallen into such a state of financial and operational disarray that 
the Economy League concluded that PGW was unsellable without transformative change.  
Since then, PGW has made noteworthy operational improvements.  Yet, little has been done to correct the 
structural issues at the root of PGW’s troubles. Recent increases in natural gas prices have compounded the 
financial impact of each of these factors, making it all the more timely to pursue true transformation. 
 
B.  Research Methodology 
With all this in mind, The Pew Charitable Trusts and the William Penn Foundation asked the Economy 
League of Greater Philadelphia to evaluate the current state of the Philadelphia Gas Works and potential 
strategic alternatives for its future. In turn, the Economy League engaged Fairmount Capital Advisors, a 
financial advisory firm, to lead the project’s valuation effort. Fairmount contracted with CBIZ Valuation to 
assist in this process. (Please see Appendix A for full description of valuation methodologies, calculations, 
and considerations.) 
Research included an in-depth review of PGW’s financial documents, rate filings, credit agency reports, and 
other consultant reports, as well as interviews with key stakeholders. The review also included a 
benchmarking analysis to put PGW’s operating performance and governance in a competitive context. 
Benchmark utilities were selected to fill two distinct comparison groups. The first set was chosen to reflect 
other cities and regions1 that have large, municipally owned natural gas utilities: 
 Citizens Public Service: San Antonio, TX 
 Citizens Gas and Coke Utility: Indianapolis, IN 
 Memphis Light Gas and Water: Memphis, TN 
The second set was chosen to reflect competitors with demographic and socioeconomic similarities to 
Greater Philadelphia: 
 Baltimore Gas and Electric: Baltimore, MD 
 Peoples Gas: Chicago, IL 
Other natural gas utilities across Pennsylvania were used as additional points of reference: 
 Columbia Gas Co. 
 Peoples Natural Gas Co. 
 Equitable Gas Co. 
 National Fuel Gas Distribution 
 PECO Energy: Gas Division 
                                                     
1 Use of the term “region” throughout this report refers to a central city and surrounding suburban jurisdictions. 
12 | P a g e  
 
 T.W. Phillips Gas and Oil Co. 
 UGI Penn National Gas 
 UGI Utilities 
National benchmarking was conducted based on the American Gas Association’s  2004-2006 Performance 
Benchmarks for Natural Gas Utilities of March 7, 2008. Metrics are recreated from the methodology as 
established by the AGA. For AGA metrics, fiscal 2006 data were used unless otherwise noted.2 Pennsylvania 
benchmarking was conducted based on rate filings and annual reports. For comparisons within 
Pennsylvania, fiscal 2007 data were used unless otherwise noted. 
It is important to keep in mind that utilities’ fiscal years vary. For example, PGW's fiscal year ends on August 
31, while Memphis Light Gas and Water's fiscal year ends on December 31. The comparison data points 
were for what utilities deemed as fiscal 2006. Also, to ensure accurate comparisons across utilities, if a 
utility provided more than just natural gas, information was obtained only for natural gas customers; other 
services such as electricity were ignored unless otherwise noted. It should also be noted that industry 
officials tend to question the validity of comparisons among gas utilities, noting the difficulties in controlling 
for varying operating environments, commodity mixes, and labor constructs, particularly between public 
and private entities. For instance, a utility may offer both gas and electric service and report its long-term 
debt in the aggregate, hindering comparisons with gas-only service.  Nevertheless, this report found that 
using other utilities as benchmarks gave needed context to descriptions of PGW’s operations.  
Additionally, budget trends require scrutiny to detect whether non-operating changes have affected year-
to-year financials. For instance, neither of the following two accounting changes was the result of changes in 
PGW’s operational practices, but both had a noteworthy impact on its bottom line.   
For the first time, in its fiscal 2007 budget, PGW included “other post-employment benefits” in its audited 
statements. The Governmental Accounting Standards Board in 2004 began requiring public agencies to 
report their non-pension postemployment benefit obligations on a current basis by calendar year 2008. 
These costs primarily reflect anticipated retiree healthcare obligations, but also include other benefits such 
as insurance. The board now requires that these post-employment “costs” be reflected in the operating 
statement similar to pension costs, which are driven by actuarial estimates. In 2007, PGW’s actuarial 
obligations for post-employment benefits amounted to $45.2 million,3 of which PGW paid $18.8 million in 
pay-as-you-go healthcare expenses. The difference, $26.4 million, is recorded as a liability and also is 
expensed in 2007. 
An accounting change in the way that PGW reports some service terminations also has affected its budget. 
Until fiscal 2007, PGW had been reporting financial information related to customer requests to shut off gas 
service which was then moved to PGW’s own account awaiting new ownership or tenants. Removal of 
portions of these so-called soft-off accounts from PGW’s financial information had a material impact on its 
accounts receivable and bad debt expense, and resulted in a more than 1 percent increase in collection 
rates for fiscal 2006 and 2007.
                                                     
2 Per the AGA Statistics Manager, data for fiscal 2007 will not be available until fall 2008. 
3 Obligation is reduced to $38 million once PGW begins to fund its obligation and realizes returns similar to those of its pension fund. 
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Section II.  Five Impediments to Reform 
 
By keeping management costs essentially flat in recent years while vastly improving its billing practices, 
PGW has achieved relative operating stability. To build on this momentum, its executive team has 
formulated a plan to generate even greater efficiencies. This plan aims to free up cash to begin 
incrementally reducing PGW’s long-term debt and even allow it to resume its annual $18 million payment to 
the City budget, which the City has been forced to plow back into PGW every year since 2004. 
Unfortunately, even if the City were to invest in further operational reform, fundamental structural realities 
could prove overwhelming. Five systemic factors require remedy:  
 A labyrinthine governance structure. 
 A low-income customer base. 
 Onerous capital obligations. 
 Rising energy prices. 
 High labor costs. 
These ongoing structural impediments drive up customer rates, which are the costs that matter most. 
PGW’s rates outpace the cost of gas service in Philadelphia’s peer cities. As a result, Philadelphians pay more 
for gas than do residents and businesses in other cities. Ultimately, it is for this reason that reform is so 
important. 
 Figure 1.  
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A.  Byzantine Oversight   
More than 30 elected and appointed officials at four separate entities have their hands on the PGW steering 
wheel. This overlapping governance drives up PGW’s operating costs and complicates every attempt at 
transformation. PGW’s byzantine governance framework has been the subject of significant concern and 
study over the years. In 1995 the Economy League found “governance gridlock,” with a confusing and 
contradictory regime severely limiting the ability of PGW managers to operate the enterprise. The Economy 
League observed three principal obstacles: 
 A lack of performance incentives: PGW’s annual $18 million obligation to the City is fixed, 
regardless of performance. 
 A lack of accountability: No governance body is held directly accountable for PGW’s performance, 
and each is largely invisible to the public eye. 
 Vulnerability to political manipulation: A lack of incentives and accountability leaves PGW open to 
political considerations and imperatives. 
PGW’s day-to-day operations are run by a professional staff that reports to the Philadelphia Facilities 
Management Corp., a private, not-for-profit entity comprising seven mayoral appointees. PFMC acts as 
PGW’s board of directors and is responsible for the organization’s executive management. More oversight 
comes from within City Hall: The City’s finance director is responsible for approving the operating and 
capital budget forms, and the deputy mayor for transportation and utilities serves as an ex officio member 
of the PFMC. 
Another layer of City oversight comes from the Philadelphia Gas Commission (PGC)—two mayoral 
appointees, two City Council appointees, and the City Controller. PGC’s responsibilities include all powers 
not specifically granted to the PFMC. Per the 1951 Home Rule Charter, PGC’s most direct authority over 
PGW is approval of senior executive appointments and the annual operating budget, but its responsibilities 
also include general oversight as well as reviewing and making recommendations regarding contracts, 
acquisitions, and the capital budget, which are then submitted to City Council for approval. 
 
Figure 2. Government Entities Responsible for PGW 
Government Entity Composition Responsibilities 
City of Philadelphia   
PGW Professional staff Day-to-day operations and management of assets. 
PFMC 7 mayoral 
appointees 
Executive management and policy direction; identifies upper-level 
professional staff to be approved by PGC. 




Approves operating budget and PGW personnel; reviews supply 
contracts and capital budget for approval by City Council; assumes 
all other powers not specifically granted to PFMC. 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania   
PUC 5 gubernatorial 
appointees 
Sets rates; serves as regulatory authority and oversees compliance 
with customer service and safety standards. 
SOURCE: Black & Veatch; Pennsylvania Economy League 
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Since the 1995 Economy League report, yet another layer has been added. In 2000, PGW became subject to 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Public Utilities Commission, a five-member body appointed by the 
governor that regulates natural gas and other types of utilities statewide. Whereas in 1995 the City 
controlled regulation and rate-making through the PGC, that authority now lies with the state-appointed 
PUC, which also oversees compliance with customer service and safety standards. The inclusion of PUC into 
PGW’s governance framework has further blurred the lines of authority between the PFMC and PGC. 
Statutorily, PGC is granted all powers not specifically granted to the PFMC. In practice, PGC and PFMC have 
been left to sort out their niche. The result is increased and overlapping oversight of day-to-day operations, 
to the detriment of performance. 
Too Much Governance Equals a Lack of Governance 
Some hold the position that PGW’s myriad of overseers acts as a hedge, and that restricting flexibility is a 
necessary evil to prevent managerial incompetence. Given PGW’s history of mismanagement, the fear of 
inadequate oversight is understandable. However, to accept the status quo is to accept continual decline.  
In fairness, PGW’s unwieldy governing structure is the result of a series of well-intentioned attempts at 
reform. Each new entity was introduced to fill some perceived need for better oversight. As a result, each 
entity has carved out a niche and serves some purpose for some interested party, and each can justify its 
existence through some chartered or contractual claim of authority. But although each entity may have a 
reason to exist in its own right, as a whole the layering of oversight and authority convolutes even mundane 
operational processes and thwarts coherent political directives. As a result, no one oversight group is held 
responsible or accountable for PGW’s performance. 
A surfeit of scrutiny has hindered performance not just in some oblique sense. It has tangibly increased the 
cost of PGW’s operations. PGW’s fiscal 2009 budget includes $961,000 for Gas Commission-related 
expenses and $3.3 million in PUC-related expenses, including Gas Commission personnel salaries as well as 
legal fees, lobbyists and consultants for the regulatory process. In other words, PGW must budget over $4 
million for the coming year simply to justify its already-constrained operating budget. In addition to these 
direct costs, substantial indirect costs are incurred to satisfy the demands of regulators for information. 
PGW’s ability to address ongoing concerns will hinge on management’s flexibility and responsiveness. To 
this end, its governance has been nothing but a stumbling block. A streamlined structure is essential and 
should be a prerequisite to continued City ownership. 
How Are Other Municipal Gas Utilities Governed?  
Three other large, municipally owned natural gas entities provide models of more streamlined budgetary, 
personnel, and regulatory processes. 
San Antonio: CPS Energy, a municipally owned gas and electric system, is managed by an independent, five-
member board of trustees appointed by the mayor. The mayor also appoints a 15-member citizens advisory 
committee as a liaison between the utility and customers. The City Council nominates board and advisory 
committee appointees and approves the utility’s budget. Rates and regulations are set collaboratively by the 
board and City Council. 
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Memphis: The mayor appoints a five-member board of commissioners to manage the utility’s assets and a 
president to oversee operations. The City Council acts as the utility’s regulatory body and sets rates and 
approves budgets, commissioners and executive personnel. The Tennessee Regulatory Authority regulates 
municipally owned safety standards. 
Indianapolis: The Indianapolis Citizens Gas and Coke Utility is governed as a public charitable trust, 
operating as a not-for-profit entity responsible for managing the utility outside of City government control. 
A self-sustaining five-member board of trustees appoints a seven-member board of directors, which 
approves the budget and executive personnel. A state regulatory commission sets rates, promulgates safety 
standards, and oversees customer service standards. 
A Local Model: The Philadelphia Water Department 
The governance structure of the Philadelphia Water Department more closely mirrors gas utilities in San 
Antonio and Memphis than it does PGW. PWD exists as an enterprise fund, a department operating under 
the managing director’s office with the support of the administration’s financial and legal functions for 
budgeting and legal affairs. Rate-setting authority is vested in the City water commissioner with input from 
City Council. Council and the City Controller weigh in to the extent that they oversee, review and approve 
City budgets and the awarding of contracts. Far fewer entities have direct influence over PWD operations, 
so PWD jumps through far fewer hoops than does PGW to run its business. 
In truth, natural gas distribution is a more complex, competitive, and costly business than water service. For 
this reason, comparisons between PGW and PWD are difficult and should be interpreted carefully. Yet, it 
would be useful for decision-makers to establish whether in fact PWD operations are more efficient and 
effective, and if so, how much its organization and governance contribute to any differences. 
 
Figure 3. PWD Service Territory 
 
Figure 4. PGW Service Territory 
 
SOURCE: PWD Reports; Economy League                      SOURCE: Economy League 
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PWD escapes several challenges that PGW must manage:  
Competition: PGW must compete for customers with providers of alternative energy sources, such as 
steam, electricity, propane and heating oil. There are no competitors for water. 
Commodity costs: Natural gas is a far more expensive commodity than water: At over $130 per month, 
PGW’s average monthly residential bill is more than six times higher than PWD’s 2007 average monthly 
water bill of $20.36. Moreover, while a water bill is unlikely to vary from month-to-month, natural gas is 
subject to large seasonal fluctuations and volatile commodity markets—all reflected in monthly bills. 
Flexible customer base: PWD can contract with neighboring municipalities to provide water and wastewater 
service, thereby diversifying and expanding its service territory to more affluent suburbs. PGW, on the other 
hand, is constrained by a mandate to provide service to City residents and is unable to compete beyond City 
limits. As a result, even though both PGW and PWD are Philadelphia-based municipal utilities, PWD’s wider 
customer base makes it less likely to suffer from the City’s deteriorating socioeconomic condition. 
Hazards: When a water main breaks, there are floods. When a gas main breaks, there are explosions. 
Public wrangling: For all of these reasons, people are naturally more likely to scrutinize PGW than PWD: 
PGW is simply more visible because of elevated concerns over safety and money. 
Nevertheless, the two utilities’ inherent differences do not rule out the possibility that PWD’s structure 
holds lessons for PGW. The fact remains that Philadelphia owns two publicly operated utilities with valuable 
assets, yet one seems to perform better financially than the other. The perceived difference in performance 
is confirmed at least in part by bond ratings: Among City of Philadelphia-related bonds, only aviation 
revenue bonds carry higher ratings than water and sewer revenue bonds, while PGW bonds are rated below 
the City’s general obligation bonds. 
A Fundamental Difference: Although rating agencies cited various credit constraints for PWD, they noted a 
key feature—operational flexibility—as an important mitigating factor: “A key credit strength is the system’s 
independent rate-setting authority. The system raised rates in each of the past four fiscal years, and rate 
increases are expected to continue.”4 Credit reports also noted PWD’s strong cash balances as a stabilizing 
factor, allowing it to spend about $20 million a year in internally generated funds on capital projects. By 
contrast, PGW has been unable to generate excess funds internally, relying almost entirely on long-term 
debt for capital spending since 1993. 
PWD’s independent rate-setting authority clearly 
is at the heart of its higher credit ratings. In reality, 
PGW cannot expect to achieve PWD’s level of rate-
setting autonomy. Still, a streamlined governance 
structure within City government could improve 
PGW’s long-term financial performance simply by 
removing barriers to operational dexterity. 
                                                     
4 “Fitch Rates Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Water & Sewer Revs “A-“; Stable Outlook. April 5, 2005. 
  Moody’s S&P Fitch 
Water & Sewer Bonds A3 A- A- 
PGW Bonds Baa2 BBB- BBB- 
General Obligation Bonds Baa1 BBB BBB+ 
Aviation Revenue Bonds A3 A A 
SOURCE: PWD reports 
Figure 5. City of Philadelphia Bond Ratings 
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Figure 6. Operating Comparisons Between PGW and PWD 
  PGW PWD 
Service Territory 
(population) 
City (1.4 million) 
City & “agreement areas” in 
surrounding suburbs (2.2 million) 
Utility Services Natural Gas Water and Wastewater 
Legal Foundation Management Agreement (1972) Home Rule Charter (1951) 
Rate-Setting Authority Pennsylvania PUC Independent 
Employees 1,735 2,039 
Customers 505,000 accounts 
475,000 water accounts 
470,000 wastewater accounts 
Operating Revenues $859 million $494 million 
Collection Rate 96 percent 86 percent 
Debt Capitalization 82 percent 78 percent 
Total Assets $1.7 billion $2.4 billion 
Annual Debt Service $93 million $174 million 
Average Debt Per Customer $2,400 $1,100 
Internally Generated Funds 
for Capital Spending 
$0 $20 million 
Average Monthly Bill $136.67 $20.36 (water only) 
Key Credit Factors 
 Weak demographic trends 
 Improving collections 
 Moderately high debt load 
 Dependence on PUC for rate increases 
 Weak liquidity 
 Weak demographic trends 
 Weak – but stable – collections 
 Above-average debt load 
 Independent rate-setting authority 
 Maintenance of strong cash balances 
NOTES: Financial data is for FY2007. 





19 | P a g e  
 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND ROLES 
Municipally Owned Utilities 
 
Figure 7. Philadelphia Gas Works Governance 
 
 
 Elected Officials  Appointed Officials  Governance Roles 
 
SOURCE: Philadelphia Gas Works; Pennsylvania Economy League 
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Figure 8. San Antonio: CPS Energy Governance 
 
 
 Elected Officials  Appointed Officials  Governance Roles 
 
SOURCE: CPS Energy reports 
21 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 9. Indianapolis: Citizens Gas and Coke Utility Governance 
 
 
 Elected Officials  Appointed Officials  Governance Roles 
 
SOURCE: Citizens Gas reports 
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Figure 10. Memphis: Memphis Light, Gas, and Water Governance 
 
 
 Elected Officials  Appointed Officials  Governance Roles 
 
SOURCE: MLGW reports 
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 Elected Officials  Appointed Officials  Governance Roles 
 
SOURCE: PWD reports 
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B.  Customers: The Socioeconomics of Rates 
Limited to a strictly urban service area,5 PGW serves a high proportion of low-income customers whose 
heavily subsidized bills leave other City residents paying the highest natural gas rates in Pennsylvania. One 
out of every four PGW households receives some discount on its monthly bill. Moreover, the relatively high 
cost of PGW’s discount programs exacerbates its other challenges: Higher subsidies increase the bills of full-
freight customers, who then post higher rates of delinquent payments. This drives up labor costs by 
necessitating a larger collections operation, leaving less revenue to maintain infrastructure, which then must 
be financed by adding to PGW’s growing debt. 
Challenging Demographics 
The challenging demographics of PGW’s customer base are a byproduct of Philadelphia’s shrinking 
population and high concentration of poverty. The City has lost nearly 30 percent of its population over the 
past half-century, and the Delaware Regional Valley Planning Commission projects no overall percentage 
increase in population between 2005 and 2035. Moreover, while PGW’s customer base has entered a steady 
state of decline, enrollment in its largest subsidy program has markedly increased. Since 2002, the 
Philadelphia median household income has fallen by 5 percent. Compared with households in the five 
counties of Southeastern Pennsylvania (PECO’s general service area), the median Philadelphia household 
earns 43 percent less; compared with the United States, the median Philadelphia household earns 28 
percent less. 
Normally, a business would seek to mitigate the impact of such challenging demographics by diversifying 
and expanding its products and services. Whereas regional utilities like PECO can spread the added costs of 
serving low-income customers across a broader, more diverse 
customer base, PGW is restricted to the City, making it difficult to 
minimize its expenses.  
Social Obligations 
PGW responds to the needs of its low-income customers by 
administering a variety of discounts or payment plans. These 
programs do not subtract from the operating budget’s bottom line 
—all the costs associated with rate subsidies are borne by other 
customers through the universal service charge, a component of 
PGW’s rates that is masked on residential customer bills. However, 
to the extent that rising social program costs drive up the bills of 
those paying full rates and make it more difficult for them to pay 
their bills on time, if at all, these social costs hinder collections, 
which lowers PGW’s revenue and raises its bad-debt expenses. 
                                                     
5 PGW is limited to Philadelphia for regulated gas services; its franchise is for the City only.  Nonregulated works such as repair services are 
unconstrained. 
Figure 12.  
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The Customer Responsibility Program (CRP) began in 1989 and is PGW’s largest social program, capping 
utility bills for about 78,000, or 15 percent, of its residential customers. For customers with gross household 
incomes below 50 percent of the federal poverty line, the required annual payment is 8 percent of their 
income; for customers earning 50 percent to 100 percent of the poverty line, the payment is 9 percent of 
income; customers with incomes of 100 percent to 150 percent pay 10 percent of income. In other words, 
customers are not charged based on their consumption and have little incentive to consume less gas. The 
CRP is a PUC-mandated program.  
Conservation Works Program (CWP) is a $2 million conservation program that takes a holistic approach to 
reduce gas usage of CRP customers. CRP customer gas usage is, on average, higher than non-CRP residential 
customers, due in large part to lack of incentive to conserve but also the condition of the City’s housing. The 
goal of the program is to lower CRP gas bills and improve payment rates through education and 
weatherization, thereby reducing the CRP’s long-term per capita costs. About 2,300 homes are weatherized 
through the CWP each year. CWP also is a PUC-mandated program. 
The Senior Citizen Program was discontinued in 2003 but remains “grandfathered” into PGW’s social 
offerings. It amounts to a 20-percent discount on an actual monthly bill (as opposed to an amount based on 
income paid by CRP enrollees), regardless of income. About 41,000 participants remain in the program, 
slightly less than one-tenth of PGW’s residential customer base. 
Federal, state, and private programs provide additional financial relief for customers but, unlike the CRP, 
senior discount and conservation programs, have outside funding. The most significant is the federally 
funded Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). LIHEAP funds are administered by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania through two grants: the standard Cash credit and a CRISIS credit targeted at 
customers whose service has been shut off or is in danger of being shut off. The eligibility for LIHEAP funds is 
household income up to 150 percent of the federal poverty guideline. About 57,000 customers are enrolled 
in the LIHEAP Cash program and 13,000 in the CRISIS program. The other program is the Utility Emergency 
Services Fund that enables customers to use matching grants to erase outstanding obligations. 
 
Figure 13. PGW Social Programs 







Residents at or below 
150% of the federal 
poverty level 
0-50% of FPL: 8% of income 
51-100% of FPL: 9% of income 
101-150% of FPL: 10% of income 
78,000 





















150% of FPL; different 
requirements for Cash and 
CRISIS programs 
Federal grants for low-income 





SOURCE: Black & Veatch; Philadelphia Gas Works 
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Social Program Costs Soar 
The rising cost of PGW’s social programs has been driven by the CRP, which grew nearly five-fold from 2002 
to 2007 because of increased participation and commodity costs. This increase has almost entirely offset the 
significant strides PGW has made in reducing its bad debt expense. Additionally, despite eliminating the 
senior citizen discount in 2004, that program’s cost has decreased only marginally: Steady declines in 
participation have been partly offset by increasing costs of providing the discount. As a whole,6 PGW’s social 
program costs from $85 million in 2002 to $144 million in 2007, a rise of almost 70 percent and representing 
more than 18 percent of PGW’s entire budget. 
 Although growing CRP enrollment has played a role in the rising cost of PGW’s social programs, the primary 
culprit is the rate structure. Because CRP bills are set at a fixed rate based on annual income and do not 
fluctuate based on commodity prices or usage, CRP customers have no economic incentive to conserve. The 
result is that on average, a CRP customer uses 131 Mcf7 per year, 47 percent more than the 89 Mcf used by 
customers paying the full rate. This disparity is exacerbated by rising commodity prices, which increase the 
variable cost of subsidizing service to all CRP customers. This trend is expected to accelerate, as reflected in 
PGW’s 2009 budget, which is forecasting a possible 50 percent increase in the CRP program subsidy and a 30 
percent increase in the senior citizen discount subsidy, despite the attrition of participants in the senior 




                                                     
6 PGW includes bad debt in calculating its social program costs to reflect the full level of cross-subsidization between full rate-paying 
customers and subsidized customers. 
7 1000 cubic feet, a standard unit measurement in the oil and gas industry for natural gas. 
 
Figure 14. 
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For this reason, a spike in natural gas prices is of particular concern for PGW and its full rate-paying 
customers, which will bear an increasingly large burden of social program costs. Like fuel costs, the 
budgetary impact of social program costs is indirect: Subsidies are passed through to full rate-paying 
customers through the regularly adjusted universal service charge. This rate structure means that escalating 
social program costs have driven up the amount of cross-subsidization between full rate-paying customers 
and subsidized social program participants. Since 2002, the soaring CRP has almost fully negated the benefit 
of cost savings from bad debt reductions, maintaining the overall level of cross-subsidization at 
approximately $24 per month, slightly less than one-fifth of a full rate-paying customer’s bill. In other words, 
only senior citizens—whose bills are discounted 20 percent—pay an amount that closely reflects actual 
consumption. 
Not all PGW’s social programs are created equal. The per capita subsidy for the CRP is much higher than the 
senior discount program because of the programs’ rate structures: CRP enrollees make fixed payments 
based on income, while senior discount enrollees receive a discount off the top of their fully allocated bill. 
As a result, the CRP has twice as many enrollees as the senior discount program at five times the cost. So 
while total enrollment in social programs has remained relatively constant, the larger proportional 
enrollment in CRP has increased PGW’s 
overall social program costs. 
Because PGW customers already have the 
highest rates in the state and among major 
Snowbelt cities nationally, its unsubsidized 
customers have a limited ability to absorb 
additional rate increases. In 2006, PGW’s 
average peak winter month8 residential bill 
was the highest among Pennsylvania utilities 
and more than 15 percent higher than the 
second-highest average bill. Similarly, a 2007 
study by CPS Energy found PGW’s bills 
highest of 20 large U.S. Snowbelt cities. But 
with a declining customer base characterized 
by a high concentration of poverty, the need 
for additional rate increases to cover fixed 
expenses seems inevitable. 
 
                                                     
8 Peak winter months are defined in this case as December through February. 
 
Figure 15. 





Figure 16. Figure 17. 
 




CUSTOMER NAME Page: 2 of 2 
230 South Broad, Suite 430 Billing Date:  12/08/08 






















SA ID # xxxxxxxxxx, 230 S BROAD ST, SUITE 430 
Rate Class: General Service Residential 
 
Supply Charges 
 Commodity Charge 81 Ccf @ $1.36362  ................................................................................    $110.45 
Total Supply Charges  .....................................................................................................................  $110.45 
Delivery Charges 
 Customer Charge @ $12.00  .................................................................................................  $12.00 
 Distribution Charge 81 Ccf @ $0.82180  ...............................................................................  $66.58 
 Gas Cost Adjustment @ -$0.06126 for 28 Days  ....................................................................    $0.43 CR 
Total Delivery Charges ...................................................................................................................    $79.01 
Total Current Billing Charges  .........................................................................................................  $189.46 
 
Meter Detail Meter #: xxxxxxx Service Point: xxxxxxxxxx Next Meter Read: Jan 2, 2009 







Therms Date Reading Type Date Reading Type 





SA ID# xxxxxxxxxx, 230 S BROAD ST, SUITE 430 
COMPARATIVE GAS USAGE THIS MONTH 
 This Year Last Year 
Avg Daily Usage (Ccf) 0.0 0.0 
Billing Days 28 0 
Avg Daily Cost $6.77 $0.00 
 
 HISTORICAL DATA 
J A S O N D J F M A M J J
 
 
LAST 12 MONTHS 
Total Ccf 972.00 
Avg Ccf 81.00 
 
  Actual 
  Estimated 
Message 
Center 
Attention Budget customers: This bill may include your Budget True Up amount. Next 




 Commodity charge – The “pass-through” to 
customers for the cost of gas purchase, 
transportation, and storage. 
 
Delivery Charges 
 Customer charge – The flat rate for meter 
reading, billing, gas line connection.  
 Distribution charge – The costs associated with 
gas service. There are two components of the 
distribution charge: 
o Base rate: The costs associated with 
operation, maintenance, debt service 
and working capital.  
o Universal service charge: The cost to 
fund the social programs. Appearing 
under the label “delivery charges,” this 
cross-subsidy is masked on customers’ 
bills.  
 Gas cost adjustment – The amount billed or 
credited to make up for the difference of 
projected gas costs (versus the actual cost) based 
on weather normalization adjustments.  
(Rates as of 08/14/2008) 
 
SOURCE: Philadelphia Gas Works 
Figure 18: Breaking Down a Sample PGW Monthly Bill 
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A PUC Disconnect 
Short of a dramatic transformation in PGW’s cost structure, even higher rates are necessary to provide the 
cash to reduce PGW’s long-term debt burden. This was one justification for PGW’s 2006 filing with the PUC 
for $100 million in rate increases. PGW’s aims were to: 
 Cover increases in nonfuel operating expenses. 
 Cover debt service ratios. 
 Provide adequate liquidity. 
 Repay the City’s $45 million loan. 
 Reinstitute its $18 million payment to the City’s general fund. 
 Repay short-term obligations. 
 Further reduce its debt. 
PGW considered a rate increase necessary to build upon the momentum of improved collections and solidify 
its financial position. Management projected that the additional $100 million would have sufficiently 
improved its liquidity position to reduce its long-term debt by 30 percent over six years and lower its debt-
to-equity ratio from about 80:20 to 50:50. Over the long-term, PGW argued, debt reduction would improve 
PGW’s cost-competitiveness and underlying financial structure, providing a benefit to customers that would 
outweigh the immediate rate increase. 
The PUC ruled that granting PGW’s full request was unnecessary because setting rates on forecasts of 
projected revenues needed to implement a business strategy is an inappropriate methodological approach. 
PUC evaluates natural gas utilities on a “test-year” basis, which is used to determine a utility’s needs for the 
coming year. For investor-owned utilities, the PUC considers requirements to meet investor obligations and 
builds predetermined rates of return into rate relief allowances. 
But as a municipal entity, PGW is not concerned with investor returns. Its rate increase requests are 
evaluated by the PUC on a completely different basis than any other gas company in Pennsylvania. PGW’s 
rate request was predicated on how much cash it would need to meet its operating requirements and 
current debt service requirements. Ultimately, the PUC granted PGW $25 million of the $100 million it 
requested, enough to satisfy its short-term cash needs but insufficient to address its full financial objectives. 
This decision was consistent with prior PUC decisions: Of PGW’s $225 million in rate increase requests since 
2000, the PUC has granted $94.6 million, or 42 percent.  
PUC’s rate-setting methodology features an underlying philosophy of determining financial requirements 
based on an assessment of net investment and related income in a specific twelve month period. For 
investor-owned utilities, this approach works—their financial objective is to satisfy the need for investor 
returns, and base rates generally are set to adhere to this standard. Access to financing—long and short—is 
assured. But PGW has no shareholders to provide working capital and is heavily reliant on short-term 
borrowings for day-to-day operations, loans that have become increasingly vulnerable in the credit markets.  
As a result, the PUC’s policy ensures nothing more than momentary survival for PGW. The reality is that if 
PGW is unable to generate additional cash, it will not be able to reduce the financial impact of its ongoing 
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liabilities. In this case, fundamental constraints will continue to plague operations: PGW will continue to rely 
on short-term borrowing to compensate for its constrained liquidity position, and when its line of credit 
proves inadequate, it will again be forced to file for additional rate relief—a never-ending cycle of increasing 
cost to its customers. 
Business Customers: An Opportunity 
PGW’s residential customer base offers little chance of improving cash flow. The utility’s share of the City’s 
residential market approaches saturation at 86 percent, well above most other cities’ utilities. However, 
there is an untapped source of revenue within its territory: PGW has barely penetrated the City’s business 
customer base, which is a much more lucrative market. The revenue generated from PGW’s residential 
customers pales in comparison with that generated from its relatively small number of commercial and 
industrial customers. While 95 percent of PGW customers are classified as residential, only 56 percent of 
sales volumes and only 70 percent of its revenues are generated from residential customers. On the other 
hand, PGW’s commercial and industrial users, representing just 5 percent of PGW’s customer base, account 
for 44 percent of sales volumes and 30 percent of its revenues. PGW is relatively comparable with its 
benchmark utilities in this regard, exhibiting only a slightly less diversified customer mix than average. 
Although this low market share in commercial and industrial sectors represents potential growth, the 
opportunity to tap this market is limited somewhat by the higher initial cost of installing natural gas service 
compared with other energy sources, and the lack of regulatory support enjoyed by private entities for 
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C.  Capital Costs and Cash Flow 
PGW’s limited cash flow over the past 12 fiscal years has forced it to continually use short-term loans to 
fund certain operations—akin to using a credit card to pay monthly bills. In 2000, PGW fell short of the cash 
needed to cover an initial spike in its gas costs that winter and needed a $45 million loan from the City’s 
general fund. Chronic cash constraints also mean it must continually borrow money to finance the bulk of 
repairs and replacement of its aging, City-owned infrastructure, leaving the City utility with costly debt on its 
books and the City government with no dividend on its assets. The utility’s uncompetitive costs are driven 
by this constant reliance on debt: PGW’s ratio of long-term debt to total assets stands at more than 70 
percent—three times the national average for gas-only utilities. As a result, PGW incrementally adds to its 
long-term debt burden each year. Although the utility has curbed the growth of its long-term debt, the level 
remains high and is unlikely to shrink absent more substantial and frequent rate increases. 
 Because PGW is not an investor-owned utility, it conforms to a different set of debt standards. Municipal 
utilities have only one way to “build” equity—through retained earnings—which can then be used to fund 
capital expenditures. The lack of cash flow at PGW has prevented its adding to retained earnings and has 





33 | P a g e  
 
Limited Capital Investment 
To keep its debt from rising faster, PGW has kept its capital spending reined in, not an ideal long-term 
solution. Over 15 years, its capital improvement program grew from $51 million in 1993 to $70 million in 
2007—an average annual increase of 2.1 percent. This restraint has kept the incremental additions to its 
long-term debt burden in check, controlling its annual debt service costs. From 2002 to 2007, PGW’s debt 
service decreased from 18 percent of total operating expenses to 11 percent.9 
While limiting its debt growth has been prudent, the utility is, nonetheless, constantly under pressure to 
balance risk versus spending. PGW monitors the safety of its City-owned physical assets—3,016 miles of gas 
mains, 457,913 service lines, 515,464 meters, and 207 regulator stations—by replacing 18 miles of cast iron 
mains annually, regular leak surveys, and its maintenance program both for in-street facilities as well as its 
liquefied natural gas plants. PGW has operated relatively incident-free in recent years, a testament to the 
adequacy of its capital-intensive main replacement program.   
 However, PGW has not been able to adequately maintain nonessential assets such as offices, customer 
service centers, and its outlying operating stations. From a strategic standpoint, the City’s physical assets are 
valuable to the extent that they remain attractive to would-be buyers. If the City ultimately decides to sell 
PGW, such a sale would be predicated partly on the appeal of the system’s infrastructure, especially its LNG 
operations. The primary purpose of the City’s two liquefied natural gas facilities is to allow PGW to store 
reserves to assure service due to the highly seasonal nature of natural gas demand and soften the impact of 
inevitable spikes in gas prices during high 
demand periods. PGW estimates the annual 
savings attributable to its LNG supply at about 
$60 million, or about 10 percent of its total gas 
purchase costs.10 
Part of PGW’s challenge is related to 
Philadelphia’s largely aged housing stock and 
its largely built-out landscape, which drives up 
capital costs. More than 75 percent of the 
homes in the City were built before 1960, 
compared with 56 percent of the suburban 
housing stock in Southeastern Pennsylvania. 
Older homes are more costly to maintain and 
less likely to be well-insulated. Also, as with 
any big city, much of Philadelphia is covered 
with asphalt and concrete, surfaces that are 
more difficult and costly to dig through than 
dirt and grass.  
                                                     
9 Includes fuel costs; debt service as a percent of nonfuel costs decreased from 40 percent in 2002 to 33 percent in 2007. 
10 PGW is required to meet certain standards of supply and demand balance, and its storage facilities, including the LNG plants, ensure that it 
has sufficient capacity to meet these requirements and secure it against disruptions in service. 
 
Figure 22. 
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Effect on PGW’s Credit Rating 
For its most recent bond issue, all three major credit rating agencies indicated renewed confidence in PGW 
by revising credit outlooks from “negative” to “stable”. According to Moody’s Investors Service: “A stable 
credit outlook is assigned to reflect a confidence in the management of the utility and its ability to 
implement measures and adhere to collection practices that will maintain the steady course required [for 
credit rating upgrade].” 
Still, according to Standard & Poor’s, an improved credit rating is contingent upon sustaining recent 
managerial and financial improvements, which is constrained by several factors: “Even with the benefit of 
stronger collection enforcement tools, the utility needs to demonstrate an ability to sustain recent 
improvements in collection rates in the face of higher commodity costs and the system’s weak demographic 
profile.” Even though PGW’s credit outlook has been upgraded, its credit rating remains barely above 
investment grade, resulting in higher capital costs than at peer utilities and highlighting the ongoing 
constraints that will limit the future viability of PGW as an enterprise. 
PGW’s improved collection rates indicate 
that its professional management team is 
improving the utility’s financial footing. 
According to stakeholders and industry 
reports, sustained competent leadership has 
helped establish professional working 
relations with the PUC—and with its labor 
union, Local 686. In particular, credit rating 
agencies have cited “stable utility 
management” and a “demonstrated record of 
operational improvements” as justifying a 
recent upgrade to PGW’s credit outlook. 
Interviews confirmed renewed confidence in 
PGW’s internal management. 
 
D. Gas Prices:  Recent Spike and Long-Term Trend 
The global commodities boom had eased as of September 2008, but natural gas prices remained elevated 
and are likely to trend higher in coming months and years, which will mean even higher bills for PGW’s 
unsubsidized customers and higher costs for the utility’s collections department. Like social programs, rising 
fuel prices drive up the amount of cross-subsidization between those paying full price for heating and 
appliances and those receiving discounts. Since 2002, this cross-subsidization has declined slightly from 
approximately one-fifth of a full-cost customer’s bill. However, the recent spike in natural gas prices likely 




Moody’s S&P Fitch 
PGW 2007 Baa2 BBB- BBB- 
Public     
 Indianapolis 2008 A2 A+ n/a 
 Memphis 2007 n/a n/a n/a 
 San Antonio 2007 Aa1 AA AA+ 
NOTES: Ratings reflects reports for most recently available natural gas distribution 
system bond issuance. Indianapolis: Series 2008C natural gas distribution system 
bonds; San Antonio: senior lien debt; Memphis: MLGW reports no debt for its gas 
division. 




Figure 23. Benchmarking Public Utility Bond Ratings 
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Fuel costs are passed on to PGW customers through the gas cost rate, which is adjusted quarterly to keep 
up with the variability in natural gas prices. Although fuel costs do not directly hurt PGW’s bottom line, 
resulting fluctuations in customer bills do. Customer bills nearly doubled from 2002 to 2007, from $72.50 to 
$136.67 per month. As a result, PGW’s nonfuel expenses have not escaped the impact of a near-doubling of 
natural gas prices. 
Higher bills tend to impede collections, a driving force in PGW’s ability to meet revenue expectations and 
control bad debt expense. These expenses are covered by the delivery charge, or base rate. The base rate is 
not regularly adjusted and must generate sufficient revenue to cover all of PGW’s nonfuel expenses. When 
base rate revenue falls short, PGW must file with the PUC for rate increases to cover fixed costs. PGW’s 
improved collection rates and cash flow have placed it on more solid financial footing. However, with fuel 
cost increases expected to accelerate, PGW has budgeted for an increase in bad debt expense for its coming 
fiscal year. 
Price volatility in the natural gas industry makes PGW’s operating budget highly variable from year to year. 
For instance, PGW’s budget grew by 10 percent from 2005 to 2006 and then shrank by 11 percent from 
2006 to 2007. In both cases, the driving cost was fuel, growing and shrinking by almost identical margins. 
But because of PGW’s rate structure—fuel costs and the variable usage costs of CRP enrollees are borne 
directly by PGW’s full-rate customers—fuel expenses do not directly affect PGW’s bottom line. 
Because they respond to distinct demands, fuel and operating and maintenance expenses have experienced 
very different trends in recent years. PGW’s fuel costs increased 77 percent from 2002 to 2007, from $304 
million to $539 million. This rise was attributable to a spike in natural gas prices, which, according to the U.S. 
Energy Administration, also nearly doubled over that period. The spike had eased but is expected to 
continue and even accelerate through the winter of 2008-2009. 
Figure 24. 
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At the same time, nonfuel costs increased by just 9 percent, from $320 million to $350 million. PGW had 
managed to suppress its controllable costs: Labor and benefits (which account for approximately 50 percent 
of PGW’s operating and maintenance expenses), interest payments, and depreciation each increased by an 
annual rate of less than 4 percent from 2002 to 2007, closely mirroring inflation. These differences have 
shifted the subcomponent proportions of PGW’s budget from a nearly 50-50 split in 2002 to more than a 60-
40 edge for fuel costs in 2007. 
Because fuel costs are passed on to customers through the gas cost rate and universal service charge, PGW 
has very little11 control over the impact of rising natural gas prices on overall rates charged to customers. Its 
cost control primarily is limited to the base rate, which has remained relatively stable in recent years. In this 
respect, fuel cost increases and flat operating and maintenance expenses have combined to alter the 
relative weight of PGW’s rate components. In September 2003, the base rate represented 31 percent of the 
total volume-based portion12 of PGW’s rates; in June 2008, it represented just 23 percent. Thus, PGW has 
lost a noteworthy amount of control over total customer costs. 
A Turnaround for Collection Rates 
Although PGW’s ability to mitigate the impact of rising fuel costs is still hindered by its costly social 
programs and cash constraints, it has made progress in collecting overdue bills. Despite a near-doubling of 
residential customer bills in four years, PGW’s collection rate has increased from a decade low of 87 percent 




                                                     
11 PGW does realize some cost savings related to off-site gas storage and LNG capacity, which can defray some of the cost of spot-market fuel 
purchases. 
12 Does not include flat customer application. 
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The efficacy of PGW’s billing system had become a major source of concern in 1999, when a new computer 
software program proved unable to handle PGW’s complex operations. Complications cost PGW millions of 
dollars in unbudgeted expenses and millions more in revenue from unbilled services. Collection rates 
dropped into the 80-percent range in 2001, well below industry standards. 
Computer flaws were corrected, and by 2004 collection rates were back above 90 percent. Since 2004, a 
number of reforms have further strengthened PGW’s capabilities and flexibility to manage accounts 
receivable. Also, Pennsylvania Act 201, the Responsible Utility Customer Protection Act, grants PGW broader 
and more flexible authority to more effectively manage the service of delinquent customers.  
As a result, PGW was able to reduce its budgeted bad debt expense by more than 50 percent, from $85 
million in 2002 to $40 million in 2007. The impact of this trend is clear: In 2003, bad debt expense accounted 
for 23 percent of PGW’s nonfuel costs; in 2007, it accounted for just 11 percent. Even so, rising social 
program costs have offset this improvement. 
 
E.  High Labor Costs 
PGW’s uncompetitive costs also are driven by higher-than-average staffing ratios. Its workforce totals over 
1,700 employees. About half serve in the operations department, including field services, distribution and 
gas processing. A fifth serves in the customer activities department, including collections, customer service 
and account management. The remainder is interspersed across the system and services, marketing and 
planning, finance, and administration departments. About 71 percent of PGW employees are unionized 
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PGW’s volume of sales and number of customers per employee are both less than half the national average 
and far below the ratio at any other Pennsylvania natural gas utility, an ongoing factor that impedes efforts 
to reform PGW’s uncompetitive costs. One 
underlying factor in high labor costs is PGW’s 
operating environment—the unique demands of 
providing natural gas distribution service to a 
wholly urban environment translates into 
additional labor demands and therefore higher 
costs. For example, the extra staffing required to 
operate PGW’s extensive social subsidy programs 
and debt collection operations contribute to its 
high staff-to-customer ratio. Another factor is 
constraints on the extent to which PGW can 
outsource services as compared to other utilities. 
Limited outsourcing leaves PGW to fulfill labor 
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Looming Retirements 
PGW’s labor force is characterized in large part 
by highly skilled workers equipped with the 
institutional knowledge to handle its unique 
operating environment. A hiring freeze in place 
for much of the past two decades has put that 
institutional knowledge at risk. By 2011, nearly 
700 of PGW’s 1,700 employees will be eligible to 
retire, which would leave behind a younger, less 
experienced staff. Although PGW’s competitive 
wages and benefits make it unlikely that eligible 
employees will retire en masse, the utility’s 
unique operating constraints make the wave of 
coming retirements a concern for decision-
makers. 
 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Senior Team 3 8 11 14 
Management 10 15 17 17 
Managers 12 19 19 25 
Supervisors 47 55 61 74 
Skilled Nonunion 39 42 50 69 
Unskilled Nonunion 8 12 12 13 
Skilled Union 192 247 273 318 
Unskilled Union 80 103 116 140 
Total 391 501 559 670 
Percent of Current 
Workforce 
23% 29% 32% 39% 
NOTES: Current workforce reflects FY2007 estimates and excludes Gas Commission 
employees; management figure excludes senior team. 
SOURCE: Philadelphia Gas Works 
Figure 29. PGW Retirement-Eligible Employees (Cumulative) 
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Section III:  Strategies for Lasting Change 
 
A.  The Case for Reform 
PGW is not in a state of crisis. Noteworthy operational improvements made by current management have 
slowed its financial decline. Yet little has been done to correct the structural issues at the root of PGW’s 
troubles. Among them, a labyrinthine governance structure, low-income customer base, onerous capital 
obligations, rising energy prices, and high labor costs, have driven up costs and continue to impede reform. 
The result is uncompetitive service that is a risk to City and customer budgets alike: the City has granted 
back PGW’s $18 million contribution to the General Fund every year since 2004, and captive customers 
continue to pay the highest rates for gas in Pennsylvania.  
Truly transformational change is needed to reverse a never-ending cycle of increasing costs. Without it, 
PGW’s debt burden will continue to grow, customer bills will continue to rise, and finances will drift 
perpetually downward. As long as the City owns PGW, it will remain exposed to these consequences of 
inaction. The City cannot afford to rest on the laurels of recent operational improvements. Business-as-usual 
is simply not an option. 
Guiding Principles 
Transformational change must begin with fundamental improvements to the utility’s existing structures. To 
be sure that action is based on sound public policy, decision-makers should judge options by whether they 
are:  
 Streamlined: The City needs to overhaul PGW’s governance and smooth regulatory relations. 
 Proactive: Policy-makers need to actively monitor trends driving changes in natural gas service to 
ward off potentially negative effects on customers and taxpayers. 
 Strategic: Policy decisions should be guided by clear objectives, and every step taken should 
advance a larger strategic vision.  
 
B.  Opportunities for Reform 
Several strategies that adhere to these principles offer opportunities to tackle PGW’s problematic 
organizational framework, rate structure, energy strategy, and labor outlook. 
Gain Control Over Social Programs 
The City must confront social program costs regardless of PGW’s future organizational form: Low-income 
customers will require some form of rate protection even if the City relinquishes ownership. Given 
Philadelphia’s high concentration of poverty, decision-makers must determine an appropriate balance 
between PGW’s dual roles as gas works and social welfare agency before reforming CRP’s rate structure. 
The City has three potential options:  
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 Realign CRP program payments from a fixed to a discounted rate structure, similar to the senior 
citizen program. The discount would aid low-income customers, but it would also reinstitute an 
incentive to conserve by charging according to usage. Such a reform would almost certainly reduce 
consumption by CRP customers, thereby reducing the amount of cross-subsidization required to 
support the program. 
 Remove social program costs from PGW’s rate structure altogether. From a policy perspective, 
cross-subsidization represents a hidden tax to the City’s full rate-payers. Including social program 
costs in the City’s general fund would make these costs more transparent and equitable.  
 Cap the program’s costs at a predetermined level each year. The CRP is the only customer 
assistance program in the state that is not capped at a maximum cost or number of customers. 
Realistically, a cap would also require some reform of the CRP’s rate structure or eligibility 
requirements, but at least it would somewhat stabilize cross-subsidization. 
Any reform to PGW’s rate structure would require PUC approval. PGW’s most recent rate hike request with 
the PUC elicited unanimous opposition from local elected officials and civic groups. This illustrates that 
reforming social programs may require Philadelphia’s elected and civic leaders to undergo a wholesale shift 
in attitude toward PGW. 
Strategic Energy Initiatives 
Water: The City might consider restructuring PGW to look more like PWD, or even merge their operations. 
Logistical constraints could prove significant: Legally, PWD is a chartered operational department of the City 
government, while PGW exists outside City government operations as enterprise under a management 
agreement. Political ramifications would include renegotiating labor contracts and gaining PUC approval. 
Still, the Water Department represents a key asset that the City could leverage to improve PGW’s financial 
position. Combining gas and water operations would eliminate PGW’s lack of business diversification, and it 
would do so with a stable—and increasingly valuable—commodity. The public policy community 
increasingly is coming to the realization that drinking water is a finite resource. Projections of diminishing 
supply indicate that demand for fresh water capacity will grow, with some experts going so far as to say that 
water is “the next oil.”  
If the City could find a legally and politically feasible way to combine its water and gas operations, it could 
transform the economics of providing gas service to create a more cost-effective, sustainable, and 
potentially profitable enterprise for the whole City. 
Steam: The City could also remedy PGW’s lack of product diversification by acquiring the assets of 
competitor commodities. For example, the Center City steam loop limits PGW’s market share of commercial 
office buildings, including many municipal buildings downtown. Steam’s lower cost draws large institutional 
customers away from natural gas. Although such a transaction would require a large upfront investment and 
a willing counterparty, it would mitigate PGW’s competitive cost disadvantage, increase PGW’s commercial 
and industrial market share, and give the City ownership of a clean energy resource with the potential to 
grow. 
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Conservation: Natural gas is a “clean” energy source that stands to benefit from greater environmental 
awareness.  Promoting PGW in this way could burnish its image as an environmentally friendly energy 
alternative. 
The natural gas industry has been actively sounding the clean-energy message nationwide. In Philadelphia, 
the recently created Mayor’s Office of Sustainability possibly could aid a local campaign. Although it may be 
difficult to sell PGW as an economic development tool—its relatively high installation costs compared with 
other energy sources hardly would be attractive to developers—it may be possible to sell the clean-energy 
angle.  
Over the long-term, PGW could realize savings by implementing more sustainable and cost-saving energy 
practices. For instance, Duke Power’s “save a watt” plan encourages customers to cut back on energy usage 
by helping to pay for house weatherization, more energy-efficient appliances, and incentives for developers 
to use more energy-efficient technologies. Customers would benefit from lower bills and utilities would be 
rewarded through the regulatory process for its energy savings. 
Naturally, over time, encouraging energy efficiency would lower consumption, which would hinder the 
utility’s ability to cover its fixed costs. PGW promotes conservation through its relatively small, $2 million 
Conservation Works Program, which educates CRP enrollees about conservation and provides home 
weatherization. To resolve this dilemma, PGW officials have begun advocating for a reform of rate 
structures to “decouple” the recovery of fixed costs from the volume of natural gas delivered. Theoretically, 
this rate reform would free utilities to encourage customers to conserve by ensuring the financial stability to 
cover their operation and maintenance expenses. Given the larger public interest found in energy 
conservation, policymakers should support this reform, which would require PUC approval. 
Labor Outlook  
If addressed strategically, PGW’s looming wave of retirements could be an opportunity to improve PGW’s 
uncompetitive cost structure. Succession planning would mitigate the deleterious consequences of loss of 
institutional knowledge and leverage labor attrition as a way to reduce operating costs. With union contract 
negotiations scheduled for fiscal 2009, the future of PGW’s labor construct is fluid and should be addressed 
proactively. 
 
B.  Potential Strategic Alternatives: Pros and Cons 
The universe of potential alternatives for PGW’s future is expansive. Yet it is an imperfect universe. While 
previous reports detail dozens of models for restructuring PGW, none represents a panacea for the 
numerous issues at the root of PGW’s troubles. This reality reinforces the urgency of reforming PGW’s 
existing structures: working to remedy PGW’s existing impediments not only will provide Philadelphia with 
more competitive gas service in the short-term, but it will also improve its long-term value and the viability 
of potential strategic alternatives.  
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This section explores the benefits and risks associated with a representative set of previously proposed 
solutions for restructuring PGW. This is not a strictly financial evaluation; ultimately, the City may decide to 
eschew balance sheet considerations in favor of other civic objectives, such as rate management, economic 
development, or sustainability. The key will be for policymakers to develop a set of clearly defined goals for 
the City’s natural gas utility, and to consider future options in that context.  
What is PGW Worth? 
Any discussion of alternatives has to consider a sale of PGW, and any discussion of a sale has to begin with 
an effort to determine what PGW is worth. For this report, Fairmount Capital Advisors and CBIZ Valuation 
partnered to update the findings from previous analyses to determine a range for the current value of PGW. 
The value of an organization depends on its ability to generate positive cash flow from its operating assets. 
The most common industry-accepted practice in valuing an organization involves the concept of what the 
value would be to a “willing buyer” purchasing from a “willing seller”. The validity of this approach depends 
on both buyer and seller having knowledge of all relevant facts, including real marketplace data involving 
publicly traded companies and recent merger/acquisition transactions. Although variations to this model 
exist, valuations in most transactions have their roots in this concept.  
Methodological Approaches: Baseline valuations create an estimate or range to serve as a starting point in 
determining overall value. Typically, this analysis starts with consideration of similar public companies 
(where value is known and determined by the market), recent transactions of similar companies, and an 
organization’s ability to generate positive cash flow over time, as measured by earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). The primary methodological approaches to determine this 
factor are:  
 Comparable company analysis: Uses parameters such as size, service area type, products and 
services offered. Most often, comparable companies are publicly traded firms where financial 
information is readily available. Once a sample field is selected (typically 5 to 10 companies), several 
valuation metrics are identified. These metrics typically examine the organization’s ability to 
generate cash flow from operations without having a view on capital structure (debt-versus-equity 
funded). Once selected, market values are determined and various financial and valuation ratios 
(including cash flow) are developed. Operating cash flow is compared to market values to generate 
cash flow multiples. These multiples are applied to PGW’s EBITDA in arriving at an estimated value. 
 Comparable transaction analysis: Incorporates recent public and private market transactions of 
similar companies to PGW. Different from the comparable company analysis, this method looks at 
actual prices paid for organizations as they relate to cash flow (or EBITDA). Once again, these 
valuation multiples are reviewed and applied to PGW’s cash flow in arriving at an estimated value. 
 Discounted cash flow analysis: Evaluates a company’s ability to generate cash from operations as a 
return on investment. This methodology examines future annual operating cash flows generated by 
an organization and discounts them back to the present. The discount rate used in this analysis 
should reflect the level of risk associated with PGW’s business, or its cost of capital. 
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These methods are used to determine the organization’s enterprise value, a measure often used as an 
alternative to straightforward market capitalization. Enterprise value is calculated as market capitalization 
plus debt, minority interest and preferred shares, minus total cash and cash equivalents. This value is the 
theoretical takeover price of an organization. In the event of a buyout, an acquirer would have to take on 
the company’s debt, but would have access to its cash.  
Enterprise value differs significantly from simple market capitalization in several ways, and many consider it 
to be a more accurate representation of an organization’s true value. The value of a firm’s debt would need 
to be paid by the buyer when taking over a company, and thus enterprise value provides a much more 
accurate takeover valuation because it includes debt in its calculation. 
No matter what scientific method is applied to valuing an organization, though, one must still look at the 
individual entity and determine any unique characteristics which may either entice or distract a willing 
buyer from making an acquisition. Such characteristics need to be individually examined in an effort to apply 
either premiums or discounts to the initial valuation analysis. 
Updating the Baseline Value of PGW: PGW’s status as a distinct entity—and in particular its separate 
audited financial statements—allow its operations, assets, and obligations to be clearly identified (including 
the rights-of-way), carved out of the City, and sold to a third party. In a transaction such as this, which is not 
uncommon, the City would identify a particular collection of PGW’s assets and sell them as an ongoing 
entity. 
Several prior studies have employed the 
mentioned industry-standard practices to 
estimate the value of PGW in a sale to a 
third party. For this analysis, Fairmount 
Capital Advisors and CBIZ Valuation did not 
consider any premiums or discounts in 
arriving at its conclusion; the analysis 
employs only currently available data and 
does not adjust for anything that is uncertain 
or not in place. This approach produced an 
updated baseline value range of $1.300.0 
billion to $1.475.0 billion. (Please see 
Appendix A for a detailed set of calculations 
used to generate these estimates.)  
Off-Setting Items: The true economic value of 
PGW also includes current outstanding 
liabilities and restricted assets of the 
organization. These liabilities and restricted 
assets include—but are not limited to—short- 
and long-term outstanding debt, reserve 
Valuation Components  
Baseline Value Range $1,300.0 to $1,475.0 
 
 
Offsetting Items -$1,262.7 
 Defeasance Requirements -1,169.9 
 Outstanding Notes Payable (as of (8/08) -68.0 
 Unfunded Pension Liability -60.0 
 Cash (as of 8/08) 50.2 
 Estimated Transaction Costs -15.0 
  
Estimated Net Value Range (before OPEB) $37.3 to $212.3 
  
Estimated Potential OPEB Liability -$350.0 
  
Estimated Net Value Range (with OPEB) -$312.7 to -$137.7 
NOTE: See Appendix A for full description of methodologies and calculations 
SOURCE: Fairmount Capital calculations 
 
 
Figure 30. PGW Valuation Analysis ($ millions) 
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funds, investment contracts, derivative product contracts, and other unfunded liabilities. A sale would 
require the City to pay off, defease, or “unwind” these financial obligations.13 The City would have the 
option to assume some or all of these obligations. Any un-assumed obligations would be netted against a 
sale price to determine the City’s “net proceeds” of a sale.  
The value of many obligations change on a daily basis. As of October 6, 2008, analysis estimates the value of 
PGW’s obligations to be $1,297.7 billion, plus an estimated $15 million for the cost to pay the transaction 
costs in a sale. In addition, the Government Accounting Standards Board’s new requirement to report 
before other post-employment benefit (OPEB) obligations. PGW’s OPEB requirement amounts to a $45.2 
million annual contribution (PGW currently pays about $18 million annually) and an overall estimated 
present value potential liability of $350 million. Including OPEB obligations, the estimated “overall net” 
value to the City of a sale under current conditions is -$312.7 million to -$137.7 million. (Please see 
Appendix A for a detailed set of calculations used to generate these estimates.) 
Factors That Could Affect PGW’s Value 
Although a baseline value serves as the basis for the price PGW would command, many factors could 
positively or negatively affect the net proceeds from a sale. Ultimately, the net impact of these factors—and 
the price PGW could command—will depend on negotiated trade-offs reflecting both City priorities and how 
potential acquirers value these factors with respect to their acquisition price: 
Strategic vs. Financial Buyer: PGW’s value would depend in part on the type of prospective buyer. Financial 
buyers view acquisitions as investments, prioritizing financial ratios, cash flows, and return on investment 
over a given time horizon—typically, anywhere from 5 to 30 years. A financial buyer looks to make changes 
to a company’s operating environment and exits after maximizing returns—typically, they will look for a 15-
25 percent return on the equity invested.  
Strategic investors view acquisitions with a long-term investment horizon, with no explicit future intention 
to sell. Frequently, strategic investors will pay more than financial investors for an acquisition target. 
Strategic investors place additional value on the potential to integrate operations, with the intent of 
reducing duplication and expenses, gaining market share, or somehow otherwise leveraging a larger 
platform to gain further price concessions or efficiencies.  
In the case of PGW, financial investors likely would be attracted to its size and potential for incremental 
value from streamlined operations. Strategic investors—especially local ones—likely would be attracted to 
an opportunity for operational synergies through greater purchasing flexibility and economies of scale. The 
value of potential synergies has been estimated between $60-100 million per year. Theoretically, a strategic 
buyer would include these potential savings in the price it would be willing to pay for PGW. 
 
 
                                                     
13 Existing legal structures may mitigate the need for such defeasance. While the study of such structures is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
continued interest in the feasibility of a sale will require additional analysis of the availability of such structures. 
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Maintain Annual City Dividend Payment: PGW’s value also would depend on the City’s expectation of 
receiving future dividends. PGW’s traditional annual payment of $18 million was suspended in 
2004 and is not expected to be reinstituted (as reflected in this analysis). The larger the expected 
future dividend, the lower the initial sale price. If the dividend payment is maintained at historic 
levels, there would be a negative adjustment to any sale price of up to $150 million. In addition, 
retaining the dividend payment would require the City to monitor the ongoing financial health of the buyer 
to track their continuing ability to pay the dividend. 
Public-to-Private (Public Company) Ownership: PGW enjoys financial benefits that may not be available 
through an acquisition by a non-public entity, potentially reducing its value to prospective buyers. 
The largest of these are tax related: although the City and Commonwealth may waive tax 
requirements, it is unlikely any Federal tax would be forgiven. There also may be a potential tax 
liability associated with transferring City-owned rights-of-way to private ownership. An acquirer 
also could face increased insurance costs due to liability limits for governmental entities. Public companies 
would face additional expenses associated with reporting standards, such as those promulgated in 
Sarbanes-Oxley. Any analysis performed on behalf of a potential buyer would include provisions for these 
expenses to some degree, ultimately decreasing operating cash flows and the potential net proceeds of a 
sale to the City. 
Implementation of “Business Transformation” Initiatives: Management is in the process of implementing 
several programs which could enhance revenues and increase PGW’s value. A portion of the 
return on these “Business Transformation” initiatives is expected to be immediate and is reflected 
in the fiscal 2009 budget—therefore, they are inherently included in baseline valuation estimates. 
Additional cash flow benefits in the future could further increase PGW’s value. However, the 
uncertainty of these benefits requires discounting methods to generate reasonably conservative cash flow 
forecasts. 
Benchmarking for Potential Expense Savings: Streamlining PGW’s current operations to be more in line 
with industry standards would drive down costs, increase cash flow, and increase PGW’s value. 
Estimates of potential reductions have run as high as $25 million—if entirely realized, such savings 
could increase the value of PGW by as much as $200 million. 
 
Ability to Increase Base Rates: Rate increases augment cash flow and increase PGW’s value. However, rate 
increases require PUC approval. Historically, this regulatory process has limited the potential for 
augmenting cash flow. In a different organizational form, PGW likely would operate in a different 
regulatory environment, potentially increasing rate-setting flexibility. The ability to set rates at 
‘market’ levels that better reflect the operating needs of the organization would improve its cash 
flow position and potentially increase its value. Changing rate setting methodologies to a “rate of return” 
method (used for investor owned utilities) from the current “cash flow” method could have a potential 
positive impact of up to $75 million per year and increase PGW’s value. 
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Eventual Outcome of Other Post-Employment Benefit Obligation (OPEB): A recent Government Accounting 
Standards Board pronouncement (GASB Statement 45) that requires governmental entities to 
report OPEB obligations similar to pension obligations (using actuarial estimates and annual 
funding obligations) may impact PGW’s value. These obligations are properly recorded by PGW 
and are included in its valuation, although their status with regards to a transaction remains 
somewhat uncertain. 
Better Use of Non-Operating Assets: If certain non-operating assets can be carved out of PGW and sold 
separately, they may have value to a strategic buyer with the knowledge and financial 
wherewithal to better utilize them. It is difficult to estimate any potential value which could be 
realized from these assets; therefore, it has not been included in our analysis. However, a portion 
of assets currently owned by PGW (certain land and buildings, possibly the owned LNG plants, for 
example) are not crucial to PGW operations and may be more valuable under a different or enhanced use.  
Changes to the Social Programs: The burden of PGW’s social programs falls on PGW’s full-freight customers, 
with the majority of its costs not affecting PGW. The costs which do affect PGW are the 
additional burden of bad debt associated with the social program recipients. These programs 
likely will remain in place regardless of potential reforms or a sale, and the burden will either 
remain with rate-paying customers as part of their permanent rate, or else the City will identify 
other funds with which to subsidize this program. In any case, changes to social programs should not have a 
material impact on cash flow, and therefore will have little effect on value. 
Scenario 1: Sell Assets to a Private Firm 
An updated valuation indicates that the City cannot sell PGW at the current time for a positive return – it 
likely would have to pay for another entity to take PGW off its hands. However, this reality does not rule out 
a sale. To the extent that it could find a willing buyer, the City theoretically could sell PGW at a loss to 
accomplish other strategic objectives. 
Pros: The primary benefit to the City of selling PGW would be removing it as a liability from the City’s 
balance sheet. The purchaser would not only acquire PGW assets but also assume its debt. The sale would 
transfer the responsibility of managing the enterprise to a third party. If the purchaser had expertise or 
existing market power, the new operating structure could also lower the cost of providing service to 
Philadelphia gas customers. 
Cons: Selling PGW would be costly to the City. Transaction costs are estimated at $15 million, and the 
process of bond defeasance and assigning or unwinding other contractual agreements alone would take 
months and involve lawyers, consultants and investment bankers. Perhaps more important, the City would 
lose operating control over PGW, exposing PGW’s employees and customers to the business plan of a 
private enterprise—as is the case, of course, in most other cities. Under new ownership, labor contracts 
could be renegotiated and customer costs re-evaluated. 
The sale price ultimately would hinge in part on the type of transaction. Previous analysis has identified 
three potential models: 
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 A: Immediate sale 
 B: Deferred sale 
 C: Two-step sale 
Alternative 1A: Immediate Sale 
The most basic model for the City to sell PGW assets is by way of a standard auction, with the assets being 
sold to the highest bidder.  
Pros: If the City’s principal objective is to fully remove PGW’s liabilities from the City’s balance sheet, this 
alternative would be the quickest way to cut its ties with PGW. 
Cons: Of course, the quickest way to cut ties with PGW is also the quickest way to lose control over its 
future direction. 
Alternative 1B: Deferred Sale 
In a deferred sale, the City would engage a private party in an operating and maintenance contract for a set 
period. At that time, the City and operator also would negotiate a fixed price at which the City would have 
the right to sell—and the operator the obligation to purchase—the assets, and a higher fixed price at which 
the operator would have the right to purchase—and the City the obligation to sell—the assets.  
Pros: Unlike an immediate sale, a deferred sale would benefit the City by creating an incentive for operating 
efficiencies and increase the ultimate value of PGW. Even if a sale was not consummated at the end of the 
contract period, the deferment would increase PGW’s value to the City. The City would also be protected 
from the risks of a standard operating and maintenance contract: If the operator failed to improve the 
enterprise and PGW’s value declined over the contract period, the City would have the right to sell its assets 
to the operator at the predetermined price. 
Cons: This theoretical protection assumes that the operator is solvent at the end of the contract period. 
Even an apparently healthy company’s financial situation could change over time, leaving the City saddled 
with assets shrinking in value. 
Alternative 1C: Two-Step Sale 
Another alternative would be to sell PGW’s liquefied natural gas and distribution assets separately.  
Pros: Previous analysis has suggested that a two-step sale would increase the prices that purchasers would 
be willing to pay for each set of assets. 
Cons: Analysis has questioned the practicality of this model, given the legal and logistical constraints. The 
City would need to value each set of assets and obtain the consent of bondholders and credit providers to 
conduct two separate sales. Legal implications related to income tax law and commercial paper obligations 
also would constrain the process. Decision-makers would need to determine whether the potential increase 
in asset value would be worth the expense and effort.  
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Scenario 2: Retain City Ownership 
Pros: The chief benefit to the City government of keeping PGW would be continued control. City ownership 
ensures that reforms to PGW are addressed with the public interest in mind and that any savings realized 
from changes to its cost structure would accrue to the City and PGW customers. This construct allows 
policymakers to set priorities for PGW and to implement them in a strategic fashion, while avoiding the cost 
and logistical hassles of attempting to terminate ownership. 
Cons: On the other hand, many would argue that the City’s actions regarding PGW to date have not been in 
the public interest, and that City control has been anything but a safeguard. Without strategic action, the 
public interest will continue to be at risk. 
There are also financial disadvantages: The City is constrained in its ability to improve PGW’s existing 
position. Although recent managerial improvements have stabilized PGW’s finances, its fundamental 
structure creates uncompetitive costs.  
If the City is unwilling or unable to accomplish the transformation that PGW needs, its debt burden will 
continue to grow, customer costs will continue to rise, and PGW’s finances will drift perpetually downward. 
Managerial improvements have slowed the pace of this decline, but transformation is needed to halt the 
spiral.  Because the City has limited resources to fund such reform, continued ownership represents a 
financial risk. As long as the City owns PGW, it will remain exposed to the consequences of inaction.  
That said, the City can take several steps to shield itself from this escalating financial risk.  Each alternative is 
viable only to the extent that PGW’s fundamental flaws are corrected: 
 A: Support internal managerial reform efforts. 
 B: Enter into an operating and management contract. 
 C: Give PGW employees an ownership stake in the utility. 
Alternative 2A: Internal Restructuring 
The City could put its weight behind full implementation of management’s existing reform plan, the 
Business Transformation initiative. PGW’s executive team has formulated policies and programs to build on 
the momentum created by recent financial stability through greater efficiency and effectiveness of 
operations and by transforming PGW’s business model. 
Pros: In theory, the Business Transformation plan would produce sustainable, long-term cost savings to the 
enterprise and the City. In turn, these savings would free up cash to incrementally reduce long-term debt 
and reinstitute PGW’s annual dividend to the City. Fully successful execution could reverse PGW’s 
downward financial spiral and spare customers the continual rate hikes needed to keep PGW solvent. 
Cons: The drawbacks to Business Transformation are its upfront cost and delayed payback. Management 
projects that the full set of initiatives would cost $31 million and return $29 million over its first two years. 
After that, cash flow would become positive, generating an average of $19 million over six years. 
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The currently approved portion of Business Transformation is a scaled-back initiative that includes programs 
most likely to return measurable, short-term gains, such as improvements to collection methods and 
internal resource management. Instead of a 24-month payback period, “BT Lite” features a 19-month 
payback of an estimated average of $10 million over six years, slightly more than half of the projected 
benefit of full implementation. 
Most longer-term initiatives to optimize PGWs’ business model, such as so-called succession planning—to 
keep workforce skill levels from deteriorating following a looming wave of retirements—and building a 
culture of innovation, are more expensive and more difficult to measure, and have been put on hold. As it 
stands, the truncated version of Business Transformation is unlikely to change the fundamental cost 
structure of the enterprise. 
Alternative 2B: Operating and Maintenance Contract 
Pros: Contracting with a private company to operate and manage PGW for a predetermined time would 
permit the City to retain ownership of PGW assets while transferring a portion of its liabilities to another 
entity. The private operator would assume some of the enterprise’s financial risk, including financial 
responsibility for maintenance and payroll.  
From the asset owner’s perspective, the key to a successful contract would be the performance incentives 
and operating flexibility built into the agreement to boost operating efficiencies and gradually reduce costs. 
Cons: The reality is that an operating and maintenance contract would not represent a dramatic departure 
from the current management paradigm and would fail to address the fundamental structural flaws facing 
PGW. Politically, it would be difficult to structure a contract that allows a private operator enough flexibility 
to achieve transformation. Additionally, the shift of liabilities would not absolve the City of its responsibility 
to protect PGW customers. If at the end of its contract the private operator has failed to improve the 
enterprise’s cost structure, the customers ultimately would pay the price, and the City would be left to 
resume operating a utility in even worse shape than before. 
Alternative 2C: Lease to an Employee-Owned Firm 
A variation on the operating and maintenance contract model is a joint agreement with a private equity firm 
and PGW employees. The City would lease PGW assets to the firm, with employees receiving equity shares 
in the company. 
Pros: From the City’s perspective, this model would be more political feasible. It would reduce the difficulty 
of structuring incentives and flexibility into an operating and maintenance contract by giving employees 
natural incentives to reduce costs and increase revenue. PGW’s employee union would be unlikely to 
support a sale of PGW assets to a non-City entity, a tack generally associated with layoffs. But union 
leadership might be more amenable to a sale that included a tangible financial benefit to its members, even 
if the result was a smaller staff. The likelihood of future layoffs would become more palatable. 
Cons: The transaction could take a variety of forms, from a public ownership-private operations model 
(closer to an operating and maintenance contract) to a lease agreement to a private firm with an option to 
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buy (closer to a sale). In either case, the City at least initially would retain ownership of assets. This would 
present political pitfalls. For an employee buyout to truly transform PGW, the City would have to retain just 
enough control to ensure political palatability but not so much as to invite political interference in 
management. 
Scenario 3: Create a New Authority 
The City could terminate its direct ownership by transferring PGW’s assets and liabilities to a new, 
independent authority incorporated under state law. The authority would issue its own debt to purchase 
PGW at fair-market value. 
Pros: As with a sale, the primary benefit to the City would be eliminating the financial risk of PGW from its 
balance sheets. Unlike a sale, the authority model also would keep PGW in the public domain. The City 
would be able to retain a degree of representation in the entity’s governance, allowing the City to use the 
authority as a vehicle to explore other potential strategic initiatives, such as expanding its role into 
alternative energy markets or energy conservation. The entity also would retain tax-exempt status for future 
bond issues, reducing its capital costs and therefore customers’ costs. PGW’s workers would remain public 
employees, limiting the potential for labor backlash. 
Any new authority also would be exempt from the rate-making authority of PUC. Pursuant to the Public 
Utilities Code, no authority organized under the Pennsylvania Municipality Authorities Act is subject to PUC 
jurisdiction over its rates and charges. This shift could return rate-setting control to the City, which 
theoretically could streamline the new authority’s regulatory framework and enhance operating flexibility. 
Cons: On the other hand, conveying PGW to an authority would be subject to certain PUC approvals. 
Gaining such approvals would be just part of a large-scale transition effort. The transaction process would 
mirror a sale to a private firm: The process of bond defeasance and assigning or unwinding other contractual 
agreements alone would take months and involve lawyers, consultants and investment bankers, all at 
significant cost to the City. Moreover, because the authority would be required to issue its own debt to 
purchase PGW’s assets and assume its liabilities, the transition effort would also require a careful 
determination of the extent of the new authority’s debt capacity. 
Legally, conveyance would affect collective bargaining agreements, pension obligations, tort claims 
protection,14 eminent domain rights, rights of way issues, liening authority, procurement rules, and dispute 
resolution. The legal considerations would have to be negotiated and approved by both the City and new 
authority. Overall, creating an authority would require sustained political and legal cooperation among all 
stakeholders. Such an authority could assume control of: 
 A: PGW assets only. 
 B: Metropolitan gas assets by joining PGW and PECO Gas. 
                                                     
14 PGW is currently protected by a liability cap of $500,000 for tort claims. 
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In either case, conveyance would require action on the part of City government and all relevant 
stakeholders as well as the consent of bondholders—potentially significant obstacles considering the size 
and complexity of such a transaction. 
Alternative 3A: Authority Ownership of PGW Assets and Liabilities 
Pros: The primary benefit to the City of transferring PGW’s assets and liabilities to an independent municipal 
authority would be the unilateral ability to build qualifications into enabling legislation. Thus, although the 
new authority’s legal independence would limit City control, the City would have some ability to protect its 
interests through the incorporation process and its power to take over the authority if it did not produce the 
expected benefits. 
Cons: Still, a municipal authority would represent little more than a change in ownership and fail to 
transform PGW. At the end of the day, rate-payers would remain saddled with its uncompetitive costs. 
Considering the numerous logistical considerations and sizable transition costs, stakeholders might consider 
ways to enhance the attractiveness of creating an authority, perhaps by including PGW with other 
municipally owned assets such as Philadelphia International Airport and the Water Department. 
Alternative 3B: Authority Ownership of Metropolitan Gas Assets and Liabilities 
As has been proposed by members of the Pennsylvania legislature, merging PGW’s assets with PECO’s gas 
assets under a new metropolitan gas authority under state law would require certain PUC approvals, plus 
PECO’s consent and cooperation. 
Pros: A metropolitan authority could provide the additional benefit of easing PGW’s structural and market-
based constraints by diversifying its customer base. Moreover, potential economies of scale could reduce 
costs to both PGW and PECO customers: PGW customers would benefit from a more balanced customer 
base and stable cash flow, while PECO customers would benefit from the authority’s ability to issue tax-
exempt bonds and from PGW’s capacity to store LNG. 
Cons: In reality, the viability of such an arranged marriage could be constrained by a new group of 
stakeholders. In addition to the many logistical impediments, gaining the consent of PECO could be difficult, 
given the likely backlash from its suburban gas customers. Politically, the marriage likely would be viewed as 
a bailout of PGW, and for this reason PECO would have little incentive to engage in such a transaction. 
 
D.  How to Choose Among Alternatives 
Ultimately, decisions about PGW’s ownership should be driven by the City’s goals. If the City’s primary 
goal—on top of preserving PGW’s core mission to provide safe and reliable gas service to the citizens of 
Philadelphia—is to bring PGW’s average monthly bills more in line with those of  peer utilities, its principal 
objectives would be to reduce expenses and increase revenue. That would limit rate increases and, perhaps, 
build a cash cushion to allow gradual rate decreases. If the City decides to use PGW as an economic 
development or sustainability tool and is willing to forgo short-term costs reductions for long-term 
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economic and environmental gains, its principal objective would be to expand the business. This would 
mean adopting policies to encourage the use of PGW as a strategic asset to supply energy at existing and 
future facilities. If the City’s priority is to eliminate PGW as a liability, its principal objective would be to sell 
or transfer its assets and debt. 
These goals are not mutually exclusive. Short-term cost reductions almost certainly would improve the long-
term competitiveness of PGW service, just as strategic expansion of PGW’s business would increase revenue 
and limit rate increases. Some of these objectives also could be accomplished outside of City control or 
ownership.  
First, however, the City must clarify its goals and evaluate its alternatives accordingly. 
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Figure 31. Strategic Alternatives for PGW Ownership: Pros and Cons 
Scenario 
Strategic Alternative 
Key to Success Pros for the City Cons for the City 
Sell assets to a private firm Valuation and willing buyer Eliminate financial liability Transition costs; loss of strategic 
control 
Immediate sale Market for purchasing the assets Quickest exit from responsibilities Quickest loss of control 
Deferred sale Operator effectiveness Potential operating efficiencies before sale Dependent on potentially risky long-term 
assumptions 
Two-step sale Established legality & investor consent Potential for higher net value of sale Numerous key logistical and legal 
constraints 
Retain City ownership Governance reform Minimal transition costs; retain 
strategic control 
Lure of status quo; continued financial 
liability 
Internal restructuring Support for transformative initiatives  Build off recent operating improvements Large upfront cost with delayed payback 
O&M contract Contract performance incentives & 
operating flexibility 
Partial shift of financial liability Not a transformative approach  
Lease to employee-owned firm Contract structure; political will Provides labor incentives to address cost 
structure 
Continued political influence 
Create a new authority Government action Shift financial liability; benefits of 
continued public ownership 
Logistical constraints and transition 
costs; loss of strategic control 
Authority ownership of PGW assets Political will and certain PUC approvals Transfer debt exposure Not a transformative approach 
Authority ownership of 
metropolitan gas assets 
Political will, incentives for PECO, and 
certain PUC approvals 
Diversify PGW’s operating environment Likely political opposition 
SOURCE: Economy League 
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E.  Final Observation 
Since research for this report began, the financial world has changed. The sudden vulnerability of credit 
markets has created uncertainty regarding the financial means of potential suitors for PGW. It would appear 
that a sale—or even conveyance to an authority—will be even more difficult in the current market, limiting 
the City’s ability to maximize the value of PGW through a transaction. 
Market conditions underscore the importance of taking the more immediate steps outlined in this report to 
upgrade PGW’s existing life as a City entity. Focusing on ways to enhance PGW’s current condition will not 
only provide Philadelphians with more competitive gas service, but it will enhance its value for a future time 
when market conditions are more amenable to revisiting potential strategic alternatives. 
Of course, the City has another alternative: That is, to do nothing. That would be the most politically 
palatable alternative because it would require minimal effort. And in reality, recent operational 
improvements have slowed PGW’s financial decline to a point where it could survive for a time with no 
change of approach. 
But if nothing is done to correct PGW’s fundamental flaws, it will continue to deteriorate, and it will do so at 
an increasing cost to the City and its rate-paying customers. Eventually, PGW will be on life support, and 
decision-makers will be left with an impossible choice between throwing more money into an enterprise 
with no hope of survival and simply pulling the plug. If this report has highlighted anything, it is that the 
status quo is not an option and that the City’s only alternative is to pursue significant reforms for PGW while 
it still can. 
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Appendix A:  Methodology and Calculations for PGW Valuation 
 
Information and Assumptions Used in the Analysis 
The information used in the valuation analyses is derived from various sources.  As mentioned previously, 
the basic valuation methods have been transcribed from previous valuation reports. Most incorporated the 
potential results of operating efficiencies, rate increases, synergies, etc. Our analysis did not include any 
‘possibilities’ and only reflected actual operating results and rate increases. We have used general market 
conditions as of the date on the spreadsheets and have used management’s most recent operating 
forecasts. It is also assumed that there would be no further dividend payment to the City. 
Other items used in our analysis include (but were not limited to) PGW’s submitted operating budget dated 
5/29/08), PGW audited financial statements, management’s five-year forecast, and various internal and 
external documents supplied by management. 
Current Market Debt Defeasance 
PGW has approximately $1.157 billion of tax-exempt long-term debt outstanding. Under a number of 
different scenarios (sale to a private entity, entrance into a “non-qualifying” management contract, transfer 
to a public agency without bondholder consent, etc.), it will be necessary to defease all of this outstanding 
debt along with associated investment agreements and interest rate swaps. Under current market 
conditions, which are subject to change, the amount required to defease the outstanding tax-exempt debt is 
$1.116 billion (including existing reserve funds). 
In addition, PGW has approximately $68 million of taxable note outstanding. This note will have to be paid 
off. 
Interest Rate Derivatives 
PGW currently has in place interest rate derivative agreements with a total notional amount of $312 million. 
As interest rates have changed since the execution of these agreements, there is currently a market value of 
the interest rate derivative agreements to PGW’s swap counterparty. We estimate that in today’s market, 
termination of these agreements would require a termination payment from PGW to the swap counterparty 
of $8.8 million. 
Investment Agreements 
PGW and the City of Philadelphia (acting on PGW’s behalf) have entered into two investment agreements in 
which PGW has received upfront payments in exchange for forgoing rights to investment income on certain 
funds. The defeasance of the bond issues to which these investment agreements relate will require the early 
termination of the investment agreements, and trigger payments due from PGW to the investment 
agreement providers in an amount equal to the unamortized value of the upfront interest payment. 
The sum of the amounts that would be needed to defease PGW’s financial obligations is currently estimated 
at $1.117 billion. 
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Unfunded Post-Employment Benefit Obligations 
In addition to PGW’s outstanding financial obligations, it also has significant unfunded obligations to retirees 
that add to the financial burden of the organization. Unfunded pension liabilities are estimated to total $60 
million as of the latest fiscal year, and other post-employment benefit (OPEB) obligations total another 
estimated $350 million. The Government Accounting Standards Board’s new requirement to report OPEB 
amounts to a $45.2 million annual required contribution and an overall estimated present value potential 
liability of $350 million. Including OPEB requirements, the net value of PGW is reduced to below zero. The 
City could expect to lose money on a sale of PGW. 
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Figure 33. Net Overall Value of PGW – Summary Analysis 
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Figure 34. Update of PGW Baseline Valuation Estimate 
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Figure 35. Comparison of Selected Companies (2007)  
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Figure 36. PGW Pro Forma as Taxable Entity (2007) 
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Figure 37. Discounted (Free) Cash Flow Analysis (2007) 
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Figure 38. Comparable Companies Analysis (2001) 
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Figure 39. Market Approach – Comparable Transactions Analysis 
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Figure 40. Summary of PGW’s Outstanding Long-Term Indebtedness 
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Figure 41. PGW Defeasance Amounts and Termination Values 
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Figure 42. Summary of PGW’s Net Defeasance Requirement 
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Appendix B:  Profile of Northeast U.S. Gas Service 
 
 





















Boston Boston Gas 
National 
Grid 
Private Gas Region 245,000 1,400 A- 







Region 1,100,000 15,000 A+ 
























DTE Energy Private 
Electric & 
gas 







Private Gas City 830,000 1,500 A- 
SOURCE: Agency reports.  
NOTES: Information generated from company profiles and FY2007 annual reports; some regions have more than one natural gas provider – in these cases, the regional LDC 
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